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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the effects of concentration on profitability in the US banking sector from 
1994-2005, using bank-level panel data. A new index of concentration is proposed, which 
reflects the depth and intensity of concentration. The econometric specification facilitates the 
simultaneous testing of the four main hypotheses in the literature concerning the relationship 
between concentration and profitability. Strong support is found for the Structure-Conduct-
Performance hypothesis, as well as some support for the Relative Market Power hypothesis. The 
results are robust to alternative econometric techniques and specifications, and to various 
measures of profitability and of concentration. Further analysis sheds light on the nature and 
possible channels of the concentration-profitability relationship. A positive relationship is found 
between concentration and profitability even when the largest banks are excluded from the 
sample, suggesting that the relationship between concentration and profitability may act in a 
generalised structural way. In addition to very large banks, large banks and small banks also 
appear to benefit from concentration, but with no clear advantages to lower-middle-sized banks. 
Analysis of the effects of concentration on the components of profitability suggests that 
concentration may raise both interest and non-interest revenue, and reduce both interest and non-
interest costs. Furthermore, concentration appears to depress bank deposit interest rates and raise 
both lending rates and the interest rate spread. This suggests that bank concentration might have 
negative effects on savings, investment, and growth. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper investigates how much and in what ways concentration affected profitability in the 
US banking sector1 over the period 1994-2005. While some schools of thought in the industrial 
organisation (IO) literature would expect concentration to raise profitability, there is also an 
argument that any apparent relationship between concentration and profitability is spurious and 
that both concentration and profitability are likely to be the outcomes of other causal factors. To 
the extent that concentration does indeed affect profitability, this gives rise to further questions 
as to what channels this relationship works through. For example, is it just the biggest banks that 
benefit from concentration, or does concentration allow the banking sector as a whole to benefit 
vis-à-vis other sectors of the economy? 
 
An understanding of the actual relationship between market structure and bank profitability (in a 
particular place and over a particular period) could have policy and regulatory implications. If 
the evidence suggests that it is a concentrated structure per se that raises bank profitability, as 
opposed to higher profitability being the result of efficiency or scale effects, then this might be 
interpreted as pointing to a greater focus on competition policy. Moreover, if the evidence 
suggests that the issue is the level of concentration in the sector rather than the relative market 
share of individual large banks, this might be taken as supportive of pre-emptive regulatory 
interventions based on structural conditions, as opposed to interventions requiring a behavioural 
trigger. Furthermore, how a finding of a relationship between concentration and profitability 
would be interpreted from a policy perspective might also be contingent on the source(s) of 
banks’ ‘superprofits’. Whether these arise primarily as a ‘transfer’ from depositors and lenders, 
or from borrowers, would have distinct economic implications for production and distribution. 
On the other hand, if the policy objective is to increase or maintain the profitability of the 
banking sector, especially of the larger banks, then evidence of such a relationship could point to 
tolerance or promotion of a highly concentrated market structure. 
 
This study quarterly bank-level data to conduct panel regressions, using data for over 20 000 
banks. Most other studies have relied on either or cross-sectional analysis or aggregated time 
series data. The specifications used to test hypotheses draw on but also extend the existing 
literature. Through the testing of regressors for endogeneity and the use of instrumentalisation 
                                                 
1
 Unless otherwise indicated, ‘bank’ refers to both commercial banks and savings institutions.  
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and GMM techniques, the paper provides a more rigorous treatment of potential problems of 
simultaneity, which is critical to drawing any firm conclusions from the econometric analysis. 
The paper also makes a contribution around understanding the channels of bank profitability. 
This is undertaken through an econometric investigation of the effects of concentration on the 
various components of profitability, as well as on key interest rate variables. The disaggregation 
of the banking sector into a stratum of the largest banks and the rest, and the further 
disaggregation of the rest by size, allows for an analysis of the relationship between the 
concentration at the top end of the banking sector and the profitability of the rest of the sector.  
 
The next section reviews relevant developments in the US banking sector, both empirical and 
legislative/regulatory, as background to the investigation of the relationship between 
concentration and profitability. Section 3 is a literature review. Section 4 discusses the dataset 
and the variables that have been calculated for this study. The empirical analysis is presented in 
Section 5, including the conceptual approach, econometric techniques used, specifications, and 
results. Section 6 summarises the relevant hypotheses, the empirical predictions that would be 
associated with each hypothesis, and the implications of the results obtained in terms of the 
hypotheses. The final section concludes. The appendices contain all the regression results (as 
well as other tables such as summary statistics), more detail on the calculation of certain 
variables, and more detailed discussion of particular issues (such as the conditional relationship 
between size and profitability). 
 
2. Overview of Developments in the US Banking Sector 
 
This section will briefly review some developments in the US banking sector, including 
empirical trends and legislative and regulatory changes relevant to the issues at hand. Firstly, 
empirical data relevant to the issues of this paper is presented. These trends are presented at the 
aggregate level. Data is presented separately for commercial banks and savings institutions, 
given the differences apparent in the empirical trends for these two types of banks. Where 
historical data extends back beyond the period of focus of the paper, but is nevertheless relevant 
in contextualising current trends in historical perspective, this is also presented (data for 
commercial banks generally extends back to 1934, and for savings institutions back to 1984). 
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2.1 Number of institutions 
 
Figure 1 simply shows the trend in the total number of commercial banks and savings 
institutions. The remarkable feature here is the precipitous and continuous drop in the number of 
institutions from the mid-1980s on. Whereas in the previous half century the number of 
commercial banks hovered within a fairly narrow band of between approximately 13 000 and 14 
500, between 1985 and 2004 the number fell by an average of 357 per annum, bringing the total 
down to 7 630 commercial banks in 2004. The number of savings institutions also fell 
dramatically continuously, with the number of institutions in 2004 being just 37% of the number 
at the peak in 1986. The fall in the number of institutions can be attributed both to a rise in 
failures – particularly in the late 1980s and early 1990 – and to consolidation through mergers 
and acquisitions. 
 
  Figure 1 
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Note: The following institutional definitions apply to all data presented in this section: (1) Commercial banks 
includes the following groups of banks in the continental US operating under licenses issued by the Treasury or by 
state banking authorities: national banks, state-chartered commercial banks, loan and trust companies, stock savings 
banks, private banks under state supervision, and industrial banks. (2) FDIC-insured savings institutions includes all 
institutions insured by either the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) or the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) that 
operate under state or federal banking codes applicable to thrift institutions. 
Source: FDIC data 
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2.2 Failures and closures 
 
These changes in the number of institutions are further elucidated by the trends in institutional 
failures and closures. Figure 2 depicts failures and closures of both commercial banks and 
savings institutions (the latter from 1985 onwards) as a percentage of institutions at the end of 
the previous year. On average less than five commercial banks failed per annum from the post-
war period up until 1981. There is clearly a spike in failures and closures in the mid-late 1980s 
and early 1990s, peaking at almost 10% of savings institutions and 1.6% of commercial banks in 
1989, before stabilising at an average rate of just 0.25% and 0.06% for savings institutions and 
commercial banks respectively for the period from 1994 onwards. Between 1980 and 1994 over 
1600 FDIC-insured banks were either closed or received financial assistance, which was 
overwhelmingly more than at any previous time since federal deposit insurance was introduced 
in the early 1930s. 
 
The proportion of failing or closing savings institutions was significantly higher than for 
commercial banks (although the rates are not quite comparable given the slightly different 
categories included, as explained in the notes below, due to data availability). The number of 
thrift failures/closures also peaked in 1989, with 332 failures/closures – representing almost 10% 
of the total number of thrifts at the end of the previous year – of which 317 were failures 
transferred to the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). By 1993 the percentage of thrifts failing 
had fallen to below 1%, but remained at a rate multiple times the commercial bank failure rate.  
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  Figure 2 
Commercial Bank and Savings Institution Failures and Closures
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Commercial Bank failures include: (1) ‘Failures - Mergers’ meaning mergers, consolidations or absorptions entered 
into as a result of supervisory actions and (2) ‘Failures - Paid off’ meaning institutions that were declared insolvent, 
the insured deposits of which were paid by the FDIC. 
Savings Institution failures include: (1) ‘Assisted Mergers of Thrifts’ meaning the absorption of a failing savings 
institution by another savings institution with assistance from either the BIF or SAIF. (Included are RTC 
Accelerated Resolution Program (ARP) assisted mergers. These institutions were not placed in RTC 
conservatorship.) (2) Assisted Mergers with Commercial Banks (3) ‘Assisted Payouts’ meaning all assisted payouts 
of FDIC-insured savings institutions that are not in RTC conservatorship (4) ‘Voluntary Liquidations’ – all instances 
where the owners of a thrift voluntarily surrender their charter with all liabilities including deposits paid down and 
all assets sold (5) Failures Transferred To RTC Conservatorship - representing institutions that were declared failed 
and placed under RTC conservatorship until a buyer(s) is(are) found or a payout to depositors occurs. Excludes 
unassisted mergers and charter transfers to commercial banks. 
Source: Calculated from FDIC data 
 
According to a detailed FDIC study (FDIC, 1997), the dramatic rise in the number of FDIC-
insured banks that were either closed or received financial assistance between 1980 and 1994 had 
no single cause or even a shortlist of causes, but instead arose from a confluence of various 
forces, of which it identifies three categories. Firstly, ‘broad national forces’ including economic, 
financial, legislative, and regulatory factors, laid the grounds for the increased number of bank 
failures. Secondly, banks were affected by a series of sectoral and regional recessions. Thirdly, 
excessive risk-taking by some banks and inadequate regulation. 
 
There is also an argument that attributes the high level of bank failures in the 1980s, at least in 
part, to geographical restrictions on bank ownership and regulations that proscribed acquisitions 
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of banks by non-bank institutions, and that this allowed weak or failing banks to endure when 
they might otherwise have been taken over. 
 
2.3 Profitability 
 
Figures 3 and 4 show trends in the profitability of commercial banks (from 1934 onwards) and 
savings institutions (from 1984 onwards). This data is for the entire banking sector and shows 
aggregate figures (not averages across banks). Two measures of profitability are shown: return 
on assets (measured here as net income as a percentage of total assets) in the first chart, and 
return on equity (measured here as net income as a percentage of total equity capital) in the 
second.  
 
A general upward trend in profitability over time is evident. The major exception in this regard is 
the plunge in profitability during the bank and thrift crisis of the second half of the 1980s and 
early 1990s: both measures of profitability for both types of institutions fell sharply after 1985, 
reaching the lowest point in 19872. Both measures of thrift profitability were negative between 
1987 and 1992, while commercial bank profitability approached zero in certain years. However, 
by the early 1990s profitability appears to have returned to what could be a long-term growth 
trend.   
 
                                                 
2
 Except for savings institutions’ return on assets, which reached its nadir in 1989. 
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  Figure 3 
Return on Assets: Commercial Banks and Savings Institutions, 1934-2004
-0.8
-0.4
0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1934 1938 1942 1946 1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002
R
et
u
rn
 
o
n
 
As
se
ts
 
(R
O
A
 
(%
)
ROA Commercial Banks ROA Savings Institutions
 
Source: calculated from FDIC data 
 
  Figure 4 
Return on Equity: Commercial Banks and Savings Institutions, 1934-2004
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2.4 Consolidation 
 
Figure 5 shows the trend in interstate commercial bank mergers. The dramatic hike after the 
passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act in 1994 (discussed 
in more detail below), illustrates the effects of this particular regulation on the industrial 
organisation of the banking sector. 
 
  Figure 5 
Interstate Commercial Bank Charter Mergers, 1984-2003
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Source: FDIC 
 
Factors typically cited in the literature as causing or contributing to the trends towards 
consolidation and concentration include:  
• Deregulation, in particular, the removal of geographic restrictions on banking and the 
weakening of restrictions on permissible banking activities. One demonstration of the impact 
of deregulation on concentration is to be found in the jump in mergers – specifically 
interstate mergers – with the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Riegle-Neal 
Act. Deregulation can be considered particularly important in facilitating rising 
concentration, in that other factors (such as those mentioned below) that could potentially 
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have spurred concentration could not have actually triggered concentration in practice 
without the weakening or removal of previous legislative and regulatory barriers to this. In 
addition, a regulatory approach that (even implicitly) regards some institutions as ‘too-big-to-
fail’ could incentivise growth above a threshold where economies of scale might otherwise 
be realized. 
• Globalisation, which may have increased economies of scale, particularly among very large 
banks or niche banks that either compete internationally or whose domestic markets foreign 
banks were especially active in.  
• Technological developments, which could have affected consolidation and concentration 
through the effects of technology on costs of entry, economies of scale, and transaction and 
screening costs. 
• Macroeconomic conditions contributing to the bank and thrift crises that saw high rates of 
institutional failure and mergers and acquisitions of failed or failing institutions, intensifying 
concentration. This was in turn facilitated by the relaxation of the regulatory regime 
governing mergers and acquisitions, and even the public financing (through the FDIC) of 
acquisitions of weak or failing institutions. Further, the virtual explosion in financial sector 
stock prices from the mid-1990s on seems to have provided banks with the resources to fund 
takeovers (although the associated increase in new banks may have dampened the net effect 
of this on actual levels of concentration). Interest rate volatility at times such as the mid-
1980s may also have favoured large and diversified financial institutions able to take 
advantage of economies of scope and scale (at least up to a point). 
• Incentivising of expansion and empire-building in the structure of managerial salaries and 
bonuses.    
2.5 Legislative and regulatory developments 
 
In terms of general trends in banking legislation and regulation over this period, an overall 
movement toward deregulation is apparent. However, this movement was not unilinear. 
Tightening and loosening of bank regulation occurred at different points in response to 
developments in the banking sector – notably where widespread failures occurred – as well as 
the legislative and regulatory environment significantly influencing the structure and 
performance of the banking sector. Nevertheless, there was a definite trend towards deregulation, 
which appears to have facilitated the rise in bank concentration. Of particular relevance in this 
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regard were legislative and regulatory changes that, firstly, reduced or eliminated previous 
limitations on activities that could be undertaken by single institutions, facilitating 
conglomeration, convergence, and rising concentration; and secondly the removal of 
geographical restrictions particularly on interstate banking, which also contributed to increasing 
concentration.  
 
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980 brought 
in uniform reserve requirements for all depository institutions and obligated the Fed to provide 
services, including access to the discount window, to all depository institutions at standard fees. 
Further, it phased out interest-rate ceilings for deposits, eliminated usury ceilings, increased the 
scope of thrift institutions’ powers, and increased the deposit insurance limit. 
 
The Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, introduced in the context of a crisis 
among thrift institutions, brought three significant changes pertaining to thrifts. Firstly, money 
market deposit accounts were authorised for banks and thrifts, with the apparent purpose of 
reducing disintermediation. Secondly, net worth certificates were authorised in order to rescue 
thrifts in short-term peril of insolvency in order to implement capital forbearance. Thirdly, in 
order to bolster thrifts over the long-term, their ability to invest in commercial loans was 
increased. Thrift lending powers were thus significantly expanded. Banks were permitted to 
purchase failing banks and thrifts across state lines – potentially facilitating a rise in bank 
concentration. Further, the legislation abolished statutory restrictions on real estate lending by 
national banks and loosened the limits on loans to single borrowers.  
 
By 1986, Regulation Q ceilings setting maximum rates on deposit accounts had been phased out, 
and regulations inhibiting competition between different types of depository institutions in 
different markets and products had been relaxed.  
 
The Competitive Equality Banking Act (CEBA) of 1987 facilitated the recapitalisation of the 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) by allocating significant additional 
funding via the Financing Corporation (FICO), and put in place greater oversight over the thrift 
industry. The legislation also promoted the revival or acquisition of failed/failing institutions, 
implemented forbearance and assistance for (especially small-medium sized) agricultural banks, 
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authorised bridge banks, and extended the ‘full-faith-and-credit’ protection of the government to 
federally insured deposits. 
 
Also in 1987, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve authorised limited underwriting 
activities for specific giant institutions – J.P. Morgan, Citicorp, and Bankers Trust – with a 5% 
revenue limit on Section 20 ineligible securities activities. 
 
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989 
completely overhauled the regulation of thrifts, including the introduction of stricter accounting 
and other standards and re-imposing restrictions on thrift lending. It allowed for $50 billion of 
public funding in order to resolve failed thrifts, as well as shifting thrift deposit insurance to the 
FDIC, and increasing the required insurance fund reserves of banks and thrifts as a proportion of 
their insured deposits. Some aspects also applied to commercial banks, and the enforcement 
authority of regulators was increased. 
 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 sought to 
tighten up regulation in various ways following the thrift crisis and ongoing bank failures. It 
circumscribed the previous regulatory discretion regarding monitoring and intervention, instead 
setting out specific interventions and prompt corrective actions that would be triggered if the 
capital ratios of banks or thrifts dropped below specified thresholds, as well as restricting ‘too 
big to fail’. The law provided for compulsory regular on-site examinations and audits of all 
insured institutions, forbade undercapitalised institutions from using brokered deposits, 
circumscribed state bank activities, tightened least-cost standards for failure resolutions, 
introduced uniform standards for real estate lending by insured depository institutions, and 
brought in a risk-based deposit insurance assessment system introducing risk-based premiums 
and limiting deposit insurance coverage. Further, it sought to replenish the Bank Insurance Fund 
(BIF) in the wake of the thrift crisis and continuing bank failures.  
 
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 gave the depositors of a failed bank priority 
over the claims of non-depositors. Also in 1993, a key court ruling (Independent Insurance 
Agents of America v. Ludwig) allowed national banks to sell insurance from small towns, aiding 
the trend towards conglomeration and diversification in the financial sector.  This was further 
taken forward in subsequent court rulings in 1995 (Nations Bank v. Valic) and 1996 (Barnett 
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Bank v. Nelson) that allowed banks to sell annuities and repealed state restrictions on bank 
insurance sales. 
 
In 1994 the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement (CDRI) Act 
overhauled regulatory structures and processes with an overall effect of reducing the regulatory 
burden on banks. The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 
the same year authorised interstate banking and branching (for both US and foreign banks), to be 
phased in over a three-year period (although it can be noted that in practice state-wide banking 
was already existing in some form). Under the new legislation, from 29 September 1995 a bank 
holding company that met standards of capitalisation and management was allowed to acquire a 
bank in any state. This effectively repealed the Douglas Amendment. In order to limit deposit 
concentration, however, interstate acquisitions were only permitted if they would not result in the 
bank holding company controlling either over ten percent of US bank and thrift deposits or over 
thirty percent of deposits in the home state of the bank being acquired. These limitations were 
however subject to waiver or override by states. The legislation also opened the way for banks 
meeting required standards of capitalisation and management to merge across state lines from 1 
June 1997 onwards, effectively repealing the McFadden Act. Foreign banks were also allowed to 
establish and operate both national branch banks and interstate banks. States however had 
considerable autonomy over interstate banking. 
 
The Deposit Insurance Funds Act of 1996 was intended to recapitalise the Savings Association 
Insurance Fund (SAIF) by imposing a once-off levy on SAIF-assessable deposits. It also 
extended the FICO’s assessment authority, brought in pro rata interest payments on FICO bonds 
for banks and thrifts, and mandated the merger of the bank and thrift insurance funds in 1999 and 
various other provisions. Also in 1996 the Federal Reserve eliminated a number of firewalls 
between bank and non-bank subsidiaries within bank holding companies, with many of the 
remaining ones eliminated the following year. 
 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999, also known as the Financial Services 
Modernization Act, repealed the earlier Glass-Steagall Act and allowed different types of 
financial institutions to affiliate/merge with one another as well as compete in each other’s 
markets, thus removing key restrictions on conglomeration in the financial services industry. 
Specific provisions included the authorisation of bank holding companies to act as financial 
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holding companies; ending regulations barring the merger of banks, insurance companies, and 
securities firms; lifting some restrictions governing non-bank banks; allowing a national bank to 
engage in new financial activities in a financial subsidiary (with some circumscriptions); and 
allowing national banks to underwrite municipal revenue bonds. Overall, these provisions 
facilitated greater diversification as well as concentration within the financial sector.  
 
In 2001 the Federal Reserve revised Regulation K, broadening the scope of activities permitted 
for US banks in the rest of the world and weakening the regulations in this regard. Banks were 
permitted to invest up to 20 percent of capital and surplus in Edge Corporations (specialised 
banks chartered by the Federal Reserve permitted to engage in international banking business 
and exempt from restrictions on interstate banking). Provisions of the Riegle-Neal legislation 
affecting foreign banks were implemented. 
2.7 Conclusions 
 
The key developments in the US banking sector since the 1980s have thus included:  
• consolidation (referring to the merging of firms in the same sector) and rising concentration; 
• conglomeration (merging of firms in different segments of the financial sector); 
• convergence (in the roles of financial institutions and in the products and services that they 
provide); 
• globalisation, both in terms of the participation of foreign banks in the domestic market 
(especially in terms of lending to US corporations) and of US banks abroad; 
• a general trend towards deregulation; 
• a high rate of failures and closures (at least up to the mid-1990s);  
• a net decline in the number of institutions; 
• an increase in off-balance sheet activities;  
• the financial sector accounting for an increasing share of the aggregate US economy – one 
aspect of the financialisation of the US economy that occurred during this period; 
• the opening up of interstate banking;  
• rapid technological progress;  
• increasingly complex and opaque financial instruments;  
• increasing profitability.   
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3. Literature review 
 
This review begins by contextualising the relevant literature within the broader Industrial 
Organisation (IO) literature. Secondly, the different schools of thought regarding the relationship 
between concentration and profitability among banks will be discussed. Thirdly, selected 
empirical studies, particularly those focussed on the US banking sector, will be reviewed. 
Thereafter, the literature on the broader economic effects of concentration in the banking sector 
will be briefly considered. Lastly, some limitations of the existing literature will be discussed and 
the objectives of this study thus situated within the literature. 
 
The two main traditions within the general IO literature are the ‘classical’ and ‘revisionist’ 
traditions. The classical tradition tends to treat the industry as the unit of analysis, with little 
attention paid to firm-specific issues or differences. The main determinants of industry 
profitability are considered to be the degrees of concentration and competition in the industry, 
specifically among established firms. The higher the degree of concentration, the greater is 
considered to be the ease (and the lower the costs) of collusion, and hence the higher would be 
industry profits. Further, barriers to entry of the industry would also raise profits in the industry. 
The work of Joe Bain (notably the seminal paper of 1951) provides the basis for this tradition. 
Bain’s argument has been formalised in the Differential Collusion Hypothesis, that collusion is 
likely to be more effective and profitability above competitive levels, in industries with higher 
degrees of seller concentration. 
 
The revisionist, or anticlassical, view which emerged later instead treats all markets as more or 
less competitive and regards economies of scale as absent or unimportant. The key issue is 
considered to be firm differences, specifically in efficiency. More efficient firms are more 
profitable and also gain larger market shares. This may show up in an apparent relationship 
between concentration and profitability, although there is no causal relationship. Between 
industries, the greater are differences in efficiency between firms, the greater will be the 
variation in market shares between firms, hence the higher is the degree of concentration in the 
industry; and also the higher will be the level of industry profitability (given the enhanced 
profitability of the leading firms); yet the level of industry concentration does not itself raise 
industry profitability. The work of Demsetz is considered central to this tradition. The 
Differential Efficiency Hypothesis thus provides an alternative explanation to an apparent 
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positive correlation between concentration and profitability to that posited in the Differential 
Collusion Hypothesis discussed above. The Differential Collusion Hypothesis disputes the 
prevalence of effective collusion. Instead, it is argued that certain industries have similar levels 
of efficiency among firms, and relatively low levels of both concentration and profitability; while 
other industries have significant variation in efficiency among firms and relatively high levels of 
both concentration and profitability. 
 
Specifications in empirical work in the broader IO literature, for example on the determinants of 
profitability, would tend to include both firm-specific and industry-specific variables. A key 
question of interest would be whether individual firm profitability is affected by sectoral or firm-
specific characteristics: for example, the explanatory variables could include the level of 
advertising or of R&D expenditure at the sectoral and industry levels, in order to analyse how 
industry and firm spending each benefit individual firm profitability.  
 
The literature within which this study is located, on the other hand, focuses in on one particular 
industry – in this case the banking sector. While such literature loses the inter-sectoral dimension 
of the broader IO literature that tends to focus on inter-industry studies, it does allow for a more 
detailed and specific study of the particular sector of interest. The dynamics in the banking sector 
are also likely to differ significantly from those found in the rest of the economy. 
 
Turning to the more specific literature to which this paper is related, the ‘structural’ literature on 
the relationship between concentration and profitability can be characterised as falling into two 
very different broad approaches: the Market Power (MP) and Efficiency Structure (ES) 
paradigms. Although both are broadly ‘structural’, they are sharply differentiated by different 
understandings of the direction of causality between concentration and profitability (and this 
leads to quite disparate distinct policy implications). Broadly, in a MP paradigm the direction of 
causality runs from the market structure of an industry to its behaviour, which affects its 
performance. A concentrated structure is conducive to the use of market power in ways that may 
enhance banks’ profitability.  An ES paradigm, by contrast, would see the causality as running 
from individual firms’ efficiency to their market share and profitability. 
 
Two distinct approaches can be distinguished within the MP paradigm: the traditional Structure-
Conduct Performance (SCP) hypothesis, and the Relative Market Power (RMP) hypothesis. 
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According to the SCP approach, the level of concentration in a banking market gives rise to 
potential market power by banks, which may raise their profitability. The higher the levels of 
concentration, the lower the costs of collusion (whether explicit or tacit), which gives rise to 
monopoly rents.  Concentration thus affects profitability through firms’ pricing behaviour, with 
concentrated market structures being more conducive to allowing banks to make ‘abnormal’ 
profits through higher mark-ups.  
 
Whereas the SCP hypothesis would predict generic benefits to banks arising from higher 
concentration, the RMP hypothesis sees any benefits as accruing to individual banks based on 
their own market share. This approach proposes that only large banks, which enjoy brand 
recognition, can influence prices and increase profits. 
 
There are also two distinct approaches within the ES paradigm: the X-efficiency and scale-
efficiency hypotheses. According to the X-efficiency approach, more efficient firms – through 
better management or more efficient production technology – are more profitable because of 
their lower costs. Such firms would tend to gain larger market shares, which may manifest in 
higher levels of market concentration, but without any causal relationship from concentration to 
profitability: both profitability and market structure are functions of efficiency.  
 
The scale efficiency approach within the ES paradigm emphasises the economies of scale rather 
than differences in management or production technology. Larger firms are able to enjoy lower 
unit costs and higher unit profits through economies of scale. As these firms have higher market 
shares, which may manifest in higher concentration, there may be an apparent – yet spurious – 
relationship between concentration and profitability.   
 
According to the ES approaches, a positive correlation between concentration and profitability 
thus need not be indicative of a causal economic relationship, especially not through market 
power. In fact, a finding of a positive relationship between concentration and profitability is not 
inconsistent with any of the above four approaches. Distinguishing between the validity of these 
hypotheses requires careful specification in any empirical testing (as will be discussed further in 
the empirical section). 
 
18 
 
In their overview of the literature, Berger et al (2004) note that many studies found that US 
banks in more concentrated local markets tend to have pricing structures consistent with the 
exercise of market power under the SCP hypothesis, but that when banks’ market shares were 
included in the regression equation, there were no longer strong relationships between 
concentration and profitability. Studies since the early 1990s have attempted to control for X-
efficiency and scale efficiency, and have found some – generally weak – support for the effects 
of both market power and efficiency on profitability. 
 
We briefly discuss a couple of the studies that have empirically investigated the relationship 
between concentration and profitability in the US in particular, focussing on two particular 
issues: their specifications of the equation to be tested, and their empirical results. However, 
given that few of these studies overlap with the recent time period which is the focus of this 
study, and in the light of the significant changes in the banking sector, there is probably limited 
direct comparability of actual results. 
 
Smirlock’s seminal paper (1985) argues that there is no relationship between concentration and 
profitability, but rather between bank market share and profitability. Any concentration evident 
is just an outcome of more profitable firms obtaining a larger market share, and any apparent 
relationship between concentration and profitability would be spurious if market share is not 
properly considered. Critiquing the SCP literature, he notes that few studies within that paradigm 
have found a consistently strong and positive relationship between concentration and 
profitability. Smirlock also refers to another paradigm in the literature that he refers to as the 
product differentiation hypothesis: that banks with a higher market share may have higher 
quality products, which allows them to charge higher prices and earn higher profits. 
 
In order to test all three paradigms simultaneously, he proposes a specification that uses price to 
measure performance and includes both market share and concentration as explanatory variables. 
He suggests that the SCP hypothesis would predict a zero coefficient on market share and a 
positive coefficient on concentration; the ES hypothesis a zero coefficient on both market share 
and concentration; and the product differentiation hypothesis a positive coefficient on market 
share and a zero coefficient on concentration. Using data from 2 700 unit state banks operating in 
the area under the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City over the period 1973-
1978, Smirlock finds that once market share is controlled for, concentration does not contribute 
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to explaining bank profit rates. There is a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between market share and profit rates, which he interprets as supportive of the ES paradigm.  
 
Berger (1995) conducts tests using 30 separate cross-sectional datasets: one for each year of the 
1980s and for each of three different competitive environments: unit banking, limited branching, 
and state-wide branching states. In an important contribution to this literature, he includes 
measures of concentration, market share, X-efficiency, as well as scale-efficiency in a single 
specification in order to test all four hypotheses. Berger finds some support for the RMP 
hypothesis, in that market share is positively related to profitability for most of his cross-
sectional datasets, once the effects of concentration and of efficiency are controlled for. He also 
finds partial support for the X-efficiency approach within the ES paradigm, as there seems to be 
a positive relationship between X-efficiency and profitability once the effects of the other three 
hypotheses are controlled for, but there is much weaker support for the other necessary condition 
of this hypothesis, that X-efficiency should be able to explain the positive relationship between 
profitability and market structure, which would be evidenced through a positive relationship 
between X-efficiency and concentration or market share. However, Berger notes that neither of 
these hypotheses are very important in explaining bank profitability, as the respective variables 
explain little of the variance of profitability (with median R2 below 10%). 
 
Nier (2000) uses risk-adjusted measures of profitability in comparing the profitability of 
European and UK banks. Using a panel data set of 63 banks from 13 countries, he estimates risk-
adjusted profitability as the dependent variable. He uses two measures of excess profitability: 
firstly, a risk-adjusted after tax return on equity; and secondly, Tobin’s q. Two measures of bank 
inefficiency using balance sheet data are proposed: the ratio of overheads to net income for a 
given bank and year; and the ratio of other funding to deposits (the logic being that other funding 
tends to be more costly than funding through deposits, hence firms relying more on deposits to 
fund their lending will have lower average funding costs and can thus be considered more 
efficient). He includes both bank-specific and country-specific variables in his specification.  
 
Relating profitability to the level of concentration, Nier argues that according to the RMP theory, 
size may give rise to market power through the channel of product differentiation. Dominant 
firms, with a large market share, may be able to differentiate their product to a greater extent. On 
the basis of this differentiation in a firm’s product, the firm’s own demand function is downward 
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sloping, and this endows the firm with market power. The use of this market power can in turn 
raise a firm’s profitability. This theory could be tested by including market share as a 
determinant of profitability, and would predict a positive coefficient on market share (over and 
above the effect of concentration). He argues that product differentiation at a national level can 
be measured as the number of branches per inhabitant, the logic being that the fewer branches 
there are per inhabitant, the greater the market power enjoyed by each bank. Nier finds some 
evidence in support of the effects of concentration on profitability, as well as some support for 
the product differentiation hypothesis, and for measures of efficiency and factor costs. 
 
Jeon and Miller (2002) study the relationship between banking concentration on a state-by-state 
basis and average bank profitability within a state. They find strong support for a positive 
relationship between concentration and profitability. Further, through temporal causality tests 
they find that bank concentration leads bank profitability. They conclude that their evidence 
supports the market-power hypothesis. 
 
Overall, the evidence in the existing literature on the relationship between concentration and 
profitability is mixed.  
 
Apart from the ‘structural’ approaches to the issue of the relationship between concentration and 
profitability, ‘cost/price’ approaches on the other hand, study in various ways the responsiveness 
of prices to costs in order to derive conclusions about the degree of competitiveness in a sector, 
and hence the degree to which the sector can be characterised as monopolistic or competitive. 
The studies fitting broadly within the ‘cost/price’ approach tend to draw on the idea advanced in 
Panzar and Rosse’s seminal paper (1987) that monopoly profit maximisation places testable 
restrictions on the estimated parameters of firms’ reduced form revenue equations. Other non-
structural models of competitive behaviour employed in the literature include the Bresnahan 
model and the Iwata model. These types of analyses neither use information about nor attempt to 
model the market structure.  
 
For example, Gischer and Stiele employ Panzar and Rosse’s approach to test for the degree of 
competition among German savings banks over the period 1993-2002. They find that all the 
factor prices included have a positive and statistically significant relationship with the dependent 
variable. The Panzar-Rosse (PR) statistic in their results is driven primarily by the price of 
21 
 
deposits, with labour price having a weak effect and the price of fixed capital close to zero. The 
results support the hypothesis of monopolistic competition, not monopoly or perfect competition. 
The authors also retest separately for small, medium, and large banks, finding that small banks 
have a PR statistic 0.16 lower than that of medium-sized banks – suggesting that they have 
greater market power - although this difference is barely significant in the robust regression, 
while large banks do not differ from medium-sized banks in their PR statistic. They conclude 
that the economic problems experienced by large German banks are not the result of overall 
fierce competition in the banking market, but rather derive from their focus on financing large 
enterprises and international corporate groups that have significant outside options for financing. 
 
Bikker and Haaf (2001) also apply the non-structural Panzar-Rosse model to measure 
competition in terms of the elasticities of interest revenues with respect to changes in banks’ 
input prices. They study banks in 3 separate categories (small or local banks, medium-sized 
banks, and large or international banks) in 23 countries over the period 1988-1998. The H-
statistic calculated supports a hypothesis of monopolistic competition, although the authors note 
that perfect competition cannot be ruled out in some cases. In addition, their results show that a 
few large banks can limit overall competition, and that even the presence of a very large number 
of small competitors does not bring about competition. 
 
In other studies using the Panzar-Rosse method to analyse the degree of banking competition, 
Coccorese (1998) finds monopolistic competition in Italian banks over the period 1988-1996; 
Bikker and Groenewald (2000) also find monopolistic competition in their study of 15 EU 
countries between 1989 and 1996; and De Bandt and Davis’s (2000) study of banking in 
Germany, Italy, and France from 1992-1996 finds monopolistic competition among large banks 
in all three countries, and monopolistic competition among small banks in Italy, but monopoly in 
Germany and France. 
 
One limitation of these types of non-structural approaches is that the analysis must be based on 
observations that are in long-run equilibrium (which is arguably unlikely to ever actually be the 
case). In addition, these approaches rely on are implicit assumptions about the nature of markets 
and perfect competition in the absence of a particular type of ‘distortions’.    
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A couple of important studies on the effects of the degree of competition or concentration in 
banking on the ‘real economy’ will now be briefly reviewed.  
 
Caminal and Matutes (2002) argue that the net effects of competition in banking may ultimately 
depend on the net balance of two effects: on the one hand, improved ‘efficiency’ of the industry 
associated with more competition; yet on the other hand, ‘excessive’ competition may jeopardise 
bank solvency and increase the risk of financial crises. The authors examine the extent to which 
market power affects banks’ incentives to monitor borrowers (moral hazard problems) and the 
welfare implications of this. They distinguish between ‘transaction-based credit’ for which banks 
ration the loan size in order to incentivise efficient decisions by entrepreneur borrowers and for 
which the decision on granting the loan depends only on publicly available information, and 
‘information-based credit’ for which banks can monitor the transaction thereby mitigating 
information asymmetries and facilitating higher levels of investment for which the bank is 
required to make a firm-specific investment in order to decide whether or not to grant the loan. 
The authors argue that the degree of monopoly power in the banking sector affects the 
equilibrium mix of transaction-based and information-based credit. When the higher monitoring 
effort associated with higher bank market power dominates the higher lending rates (also 
associated with higher market power), it is optimal for banks to have some degree of market 
power. 
  
General equilibrium models have found that less competitive banking systems may have 
negative effects for the economy, for example on income and the business cycle (Smith 1998).  
Cetorelli (2004) finds that monopoly banking affects the financing of credit-constrained firms by 
facilitating the adoption of new and superior technologies as well reducing the costs of the 
screening process for new loans, yet these gains are offset by the redistribution of productive 
resources towards higher profit margins of banks.  
 
Guzman employs a simple general equilibrium model to examine how banking market structure 
– specifically comparing a monopolistic and competitive banking structure – affects long-run 
capital accumulation and economic growth. He finds firstly that monopoly banking tends to 
depress capital stock and thus reduce the level of long-run real activity, either because under 
credit-rationing a monopoly bank rations credit more severely than is the case under competitive 
banking, or in the absence of credit rationing monopoly banking results in excessive monitoring 
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of credit-financed investment, both of which depress capital accumulation. Guzman’s second key 
result is that monopoly banking is less likely to lead to credit rationing than is competitive 
banking. Thirdly, under credit rationing a monopolistic banking system leads to lower interest 
rates on deposits, but in the absence of credit rationing the interest rate charged on loans is higher 
under monopoly banking. Fourthly, the resources consumed by the banking sector due to 
monitoring of investment projects will be highest under monopoly banking. Finally, 
development trap phenomena are less likely to arise under competitive banking, and are likely to 
be less severe if they do arise. 
 
Corvoisier and Gropp (2001) examine the effects of concentration on retail interest rates among 
European banks in the period 1993-1999. They estimate a simple Cournot model of bank pricing, 
with country- and product-specific measures of bank concentration. The authors find that higher 
levels of concentration may have resulted in less competitive pricing (higher interest margins) 
associated with collusion, in the case of loans and demand deposits. The highly information-
intensive character of the loans may be conducive to concentration-induced collusion in this 
market, allowing banks to use their information advantage to extract rents from borrowers. For 
demand deposits, the importance of geographical proximity and the costs involved for firms or 
households in shopping around for demand deposits beyond their local market may be relevant to 
the relationship between higher concentration and less competitive pricing in this market. 
However, they do not find higher margins in more concentrated markets for savings and time 
deposits, and suggest that this could be attributed to an increase in contestability that occurred 
concurrently with the increase in concentration. The authors also argue that the lower importance 
of geographical proximity with respect to savings and time deposits (relative to demand deposits) 
and likely greater willingness of savers to go beyond their local area in pursuit of higher interest 
rates, may reduce the effects of concentration on pricing. 
 
In conclusion, we can note that most econometric analysis of the relationship between 
concentration and profitability use either cross-sectional or aggregated time series methods. 
There is surprisingly little analysis using panel data (as in this study), given the advantages of 
these methods.  
 
Further, there appears to be limited econometric analysis employing formal tests of endogeneity 
and appropriate instrumentalisation of key variables. As discussed elsewhere, this could be 
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considered particularly important given the nature of the relationships being studied and possible 
issues of simultaneity.  
  
In terms of results, there are no decisive and generalisable empirical results that seem to emerge 
from the literature on the relationship between concentration and profitability among US banks 
(and certainly not for the recent period which this paper studies). This makes direct 
comparability of empirical results difficult. Much seems to hinge on issues of specification and 
sample.  
 
Most of the literature focuses on the overall relationship between concentration and profitability. 
This neglects to analyse intermediate variables and channels of profitability, as well as the 
effects of concentration on various interest rates. The literature on the effects of banking 
structure on real variables tends to be rather disconnected from the literature on the 
concentration-profitability relationship. This paper looks holistically at the relationships between 
concentration and both the components of profitability and key interest rates as well as 
profitability itself. 
 
4. Data 
4.1   Dataset 
 
The dataset used in the empirical analysis is Standard and Poor’s Bank Compustat Dataset. 
Results reported here are all from the Bank Compustat Quarterly Dataset. The findings are 
supported when the Annual Dataset is used. Bank Compustat provides detailed balance sheet and 
income statement by bank and by quarter. This allows for more sophisticated analysis and 
consideration of heterogeneity amongst institutions than would be possible with aggregated time 
series data.  
 
The following categories of financial institutions are included in the sample: Commercial Banks; 
National Commercial Banks; Savings Institutions that are not Federally Chartered, Savings 
Institutions that are Federally Chartered, and State Commercial Banks. Life Assurers were 
excluded from the sample, as were banks that were classified as American Depository Shares 
(ADSs) and American Depository Receipts (ADRs), in order to focus the analysis as much as 
possible on the U.S. domestic banking market.  
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Banks that did not have a minimum of six consecutive quarters of full data were excluded from 
the sample. This was done both in order to avoid banks with excessively patchy data, and in 
particular to minimise any unintended changes to the sample when lag structures are introduced. 
The small number of banks that did not have positive mean profitability over the sample period 
were also excluded.  
 
4.2   Description of variables 
 
This section briefly describes each of the variables used in the regressions. Further detail on the 
construction of variables is provided in Appendix 3 where pertinent. 
 
Variable Meaning Comments 
 
Dependent variables: 
m
t,ipi  
profitability of bank i in quarter t using 
measure m 
profitability is measured using 
two different measures: ROAt,ipi  is 
return on assets (ROA) and 
ROE
t,ipi  is return on equity (ROE). 
(total gross interest 
income /TA)i,t 
ratio of total gross interest income to total 
assets of bank i in quarter t 
 
(total gross interest 
income /equity)i,t 
ratio of total gross interest income to total 
equity capital of bank i in quarter t 
 
(interest expense 
/TA)i,t 
ratio of interest expenses to total assets of 
bank i in quarter t 
 
(interest expense 
/equity)i,t 
ratio of interest expenses to total equity 
capital of bank i in quarter t 
 
(other income /TA)i,t ratio of other income to total assets of 
bank i in quarter t 
 
(other income 
/equity)i,t 
ratio of other income to total equity 
capital of bank i in quarter t 
 
(other expenses 
/TA)i,t 
ratio of other expenses to total assets of 
bank i in quarter t 
 
(other expenses 
/equity)i,t 
ratio of other expenses to total equity 
capital of bank i in quarter t 
 
deposit interest ratei,t ratio of interest on deposits to total 
deposits of bank i in quarter t  
 
lending interest ratei,t ratio of interest and fees on loans to the 
sum of gross loans, valuation portion of 
reserves for loan losses, and unearned 
discount/income, for bank i in quarter t 
 
interest rate spreadi,t difference between the lending and 
deposit interest rates for bank i in quarter t 
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Explanatory variables: 
x
t,Iconc  
index of market concentration in sector I 
in quarter t using measure x 
1
t,Iconc  represents an index of 
the weighted share of the largest 
2% of institutions in sector I in 
each quarter in the total assets of 
that sector in that quarter, where 
sector I is either commercial 
banks or savings institutions. 
2
t,Iconc  is similarly constructed 
by represents the largest 5% of 
each type of institutions in each 
quarter.  
CRa standard concentration measure  CR10 for the commercial banks 
and CR3 for savings institutions 
(given the differential number of 
banks in these sectors). This is 
included for comparison 
purposes. 
MS,t market share of bank i in quarter t the share of the aggregate net 
income of banks for quarter t 
accounted for by bank i.  
lnTAi,t size of bank i in quarter t natural log of the (real) total 
assets of bank i in quarter t 
(lnTAi,t)2 size of bank i in quarter t, squared natural log of the total assets of 
bank i in quarter t, squared 
OPEFFi,t measure of the operational inefficiency of 
bank i in quarter t 
ratio of its total other expenses 
to net income.  
 
Control variables: 
CAi,t capital asset ratio of bank i in quarter t  
CDTAi,t cash and dues from banks as a percentage 
of total assets, for bank in quarter t 
 
TIATAi,t total invested assets as a percentage of 
total assets, for bank in quarter t 
 
PEi,t price earnings ratio of bank I in quarter t  
 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
5.1   Conceptual approach 
 
Concentration at the top end of the banking sector can facilitate (and may or may not actually 
lead to) collusion among these banks. Collusion may allow them to charge higher lending rates 
and/or to pay lower interest rates on deposits and borrowings. Either or both of these effects 
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would increase the profitability of the colluding banks, through a transfer from borrowers or 
lenders respectively. Further, concentration may be conducive to a high degree of political and 
economic power of the banking sector, or at least of the largest banks. This could have positive 
effects on bank profitability in broader ways, such as a more favourable regulatory environment.  
 
One interesting issue that arises, to be discussed empirically later, is the extent to which 
concentration among the top banks is favourable for these banks alone, or for the banking sector 
more broadly. This question calls for an investigation of whether any apparent relationship 
between concentration and profitability in the banking sector is a reflection of an actual causal 
relationship of the entire sector – and if so through which channels such a relationship operates – 
or whether it is just a manifestation of higher profits obtained by the top banks as a product of 
their collusion.      
 
On the one hand, under a concentrated market structure, where the top banks have a relatively 
high share of the market, these banks may be better able to increase their own profits. There are 
several possible channels through which such a relationship might operate. Given the definition 
of concentration in terms of market share, a higher degree of concentration among the top banks 
means that there may be intra-sectoral (within the banking sector) effects on profitability. Such 
effects could be realized through both compositional and causal channels. These mechanisms 
would be contingent on the reasons for higher concentration among the top ten banks.  If the 
rising concentration is primarily as a result of mergers and acquisitions, then the effects of this 
on profitability would depend on the one hand on the relative profitability of the 
merged/acquired banks being ‘brought into’ the stratum of banks included in the concentration 
indices; as well as on the other hand on dynamic effects of the mergers and acquisitions on the 
profitability of both banks, for example through possible economies of scale. While the gaining 
of a larger market share by the top banks would naturally lead to a higher profit share of the top 
banks, the effect on the profit rate (the dependent variable in the econometric analysis that 
follows) is less clear, although it is hypothesised to be positive.  
 
In terms of the impact of higher levels of concentration on the relationships between banks and 
other sectors, a greater market share of the top banks may increase their ‘power’ relative to 
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consumers and non-financial corporations (both borrowers and depositors). This power may 
operate in various ways, such as collusion, political power to secure a favourable regulatory 
environment, etc. Under these circumstances banks may gain superprofits in various ways. They 
may be able to charge ‘abnormally’ high interest rate charges (or fees) on loans, and/or they may 
be able to pay ‘abnormally’ low interest rates on deposits and borrowings. Profits might also be 
raised in banks’ non-interest activities.3  
 
Note that these may not necessarily lead to profit rates of the top banks actually exceeding those 
of other banks. There could potentially be aspects of size – such as diseconomies of scale after a 
certain point – that would mitigate against the giant banks necessarily having the highest profit 
rates. The point is that high levels of concentration at the top may allow the top banks to enjoy 
higher profit rates than would otherwise be the case. 
 
The relationship between concentration at the top, and the profitability of the rest of the banking 
sector, is more complex. There may be distinct and potentially opposing effects of concentration 
on the profitability of the rest of the sector. On the one hand, insofar as the market share of the 
rest of the sector is declining relative to the top banks, notably through mergers and acquisitions, 
this could have an indeterminate effect on their profit rate as discussed above (through the 
compositional and causal mechanisms). 
 
On the other hand, insofar as concentration of the top banks increases their overall power vis-à-
vis the non-financial sectors (households, industry, and government; both depositors and 
borrowers) and this allows the top banks to extract higher profits (notably through a higher 
interest rate spread), and insofar as the top banks act as ‘price-leaders’ for the rest of the banking 
sector or at least for the next layer of banks, then one might expect a positive effect of the 
concentration of the top banks on the profitability on the rest through a ‘trickle-down’ effect.  
 
In other words, a high market share concentrated among the top banks could be conducive to 
collusive behaviour among them which could facilitate higher levels of profitability for the 
colluding banks. If such behaviour includes, for example, a pricing structure that facilitates 
                                                 
3
 Types of non-interest revenue include service charges on deposit accounts’ other service charges, collection and 
exchange charges, commissions and fees; and profit on securities sold or redeemed. 
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higher interest rate spreads and hence higher profitability, it might as a by-product allow non-
colluding banks to also maintain higher interest rate spreads and hence higher profitability than 
would otherwise be the case.  
 
In addition, a highly concentrated top end of the banking market may render the sector more 
economically and politically powerful, for example through a more favourable legislative and 
regulatory environment, although whether such effects would be limited to the top banks, to 
particular categories of large banks, or generic to the banking sector as a whole, would be 
conjuncturally contingent.  
 
The net relationship between concentration at the top and the profitability of the rest of the 
banking sector is thus a priori indeterminate.  
 
In order to empirically test the relationships discussed above, the following lines of investigation 
were pursued: 
• Firstly, testing the relationship between bank concentration and profitability at the 
‘aggregate’ level (i.e. the entire dataset). To this end a baseline equation is specified that is 
intended to isolate the effects of concentration in its own right on profitability. 
• This relationship is then re-estimated excluding those banks whose asset shares are included 
in the computation of the concentration indices. That is, the key explanatory variables of 
interest (the two concentration indices) are constructed using data for a subset of the largest 
banks, while the dependent variable (and other variables in the regression) is for the rest of 
the banking sector excluding those large banks. The object of this step is to establish whether 
the effects of concentration on profitability are merely through raised profitability of the 
large banks whose asset shares are raising the concentration index, or whether there are more 
generalised structural effects on the sector as a whole. 
• The baseline specification is also re-estimated for sub-samples of the dataset disaggregated 
by size (into quintiles, quartiles, and thirds respectively) in order to attempt to distinguish 
differences in the concentration-profitability relationship by bank size. 
• The final part of the analysis tests for some of the mechanisms through which the 
concentration-profitability relationship may operate. Two methods of analysis are used in this 
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regard. Firstly, profitability is disaggregated into its component parts (gross interest income; 
interest expense; other income; and other expense; each as a ratio of total assets and total 
equity capital respectively) in order to investigate which component(s) of profitability are 
affected by concentration. Secondly, banks’ deposit interest rate, lending interest rate, and 
interest rate spread are specified as dependent variables in order to ascertain the effects of 
concentration on each of these.   
 
5.2   Econometric Methods 
 
Equations were estimated using four econometric techniques: OLS (both static and dynamic); 2-
step efficient GMM; dynamic Arellano-Bond GMM; and 2-step dynamic Arellano-
Bover/Blundell-Bond GMM. The econometric methods used, particularly the GMM methods, 
will now be briefly reviewed.  
 
Firstly, OLS regressions were all run with two-way fixed effects, between banks and between 
quarters. Both static and dynamic specifications were used, as discussed later.  
 
Three GMM methods were also used. The employment of GMM techniques could be considered 
appropriate in obtaining efficient and consistent estimation in the presence of heteroskedasticity 
of unknown form, through the exploitation of orthogonality conditions.  GMM specifications 
may also be more appropriate for dynamic models than simply including a lagged term of the 
dependent variable in an OLS specification.     
 
Instrumental variables were also used in the GMM specifications in order to deal with possible 
endogeneity of the regressors. Whilst endogeneity of regressors is of course a problem in 
general, this issue is of particular pertinence in this study given the economic relationships being 
investigated. As discussed elsewhere in this paper, the issue of the direction of causality between 
concentration and profitability is a critical and contentious question in the literature. The ES 
schools of thought would posit a relationship from bank profitability to size, market share, and 
concentration. The issue of possible simultaneity in regression specifications thus presents a 
challenge for deriving strong conclusions from regressions that appear to find a causal 
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relationship from concentration to profitability, yet do not take account of possible issues of 
endogeneity and simultaneity. 
 
In order to deal with this issue, regressors were instrumentalised and tested for endogeneity. 
Variables were instrumentalised in the first instance with lags of their own levels. It is important 
in selecting instruments that they be appropriate: both relevant – in terms of their correlation 
with the regressors to be instrumentalised - and valid – in terms of orthogonality with the errors. 
Proposed instruments were thus assessed for their relevance by considering the (individual and 
joint) significance of the excluded instruments in the first-stage regressions (which are reduced 
form regressions of the potentially endogenous variables on the full set of proposed instruments, 
i.e. testing the explanatory power of the exclude instruments over each potentially endogenous 
regressor). The Bound F-statistics, t-statistics, and Shea ‘partial R2’ were examined for each of 
the potentially endogenous regressors in this manner.  
 
The validity of subsets of the proposed instruments was tested using the J-statistic from the 
Hansen test (which is the value of the GMM objective function evaluated at the current GMM 
estimator).  The ‘difference-in-Sargan’ statistic4 test was also employed in order to test a subset 
of orthogonality conditions (for a subset of instruments whose validity needs to be tested).  
 
Once appropriate instruments were found for potentially endogenous regressors (which were 
various lagged values of the suspect regressors), the endogeneity of these regressors were tested 
for. This was implemented through the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test, which involves a 
comparison of the coefficient vectors obtained through OLS and IV estimation5. The OLS 
estimate of the error variance is used to form the Hausman statistic.6 Suspect regressors were 
tested for possible endogeneity both individually and as a subset of regressors.  
 
                                                 
4
 Also known as the C-statistic or the distance difference statistic. 
5
 Note that both the DWH endogeneity tests as well as the Sargan-type tests discussed earlier are essentially all tests 
of linear combinations of orthogonality conditions. In fact, under certain conditions the C and Hausman statistics 
would be equivalent.  
6
 There are variations in the precise method of forming the Hausman statistic, contingent on the estimates of the 
asymptotic variances that are used. The Hausman statistic is sometimes formed using the IV statistic of the error 
variance. However, the form employed here (what can be termed the Durbin version) appears to be preferred as it is 
more efficient, and also performs better when the instruments are weak. (Baum et al 2003).  
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None of the regressors were found to be endogenous through the testing process discussed 
above. This was an important finding for two reasons. Firstly, it suggests that (at least on this 
count) the results from the OLS regressions are not necessarily inconsistent. These results are 
thus reported in this paper, along with the GMM results. Secondly, it may suggest that if market 
share and concentration are not endogenous to profitability – at least on a quarterly basis as 
tested for here – then a finding that concentration does appear to raise profitability may actually 
be robust and economically significant, and not just a manifestation of spurious correlation or 
reverse causality.  
 
The finding of no endogeneity was actually to be expected for the concentration variable in 
particular, given that it is defined for the entire commercial banking and savings institution 
sectors for any given quarter. The way in which this variable was defined makes it virtually 
exogenous to the profitability of any single institution in any given quarter.7 The question of 
possible endogeneity was thus more relevant to the other regressors.  
 
Despite the finding of no endogeneity of regressors, they were still treated as either endogenous 
or predetermined and instrumentalised accordingly. Although the DWH test showed them not to 
be endogenous, they may still be predetermined (and economic theory would suggest that at least 
some regressors, such as market share and size, could be predetermined). Further, the DWH test 
may not be entirely conclusive, particularly as it appears to be somewhat sensitive to the choice 
of instrumental variables. In addition, as discussed above, possible simultaneity is a particularly 
important issue for this study.  Instrumentalisation is also integral to the GMM techniques which 
are preferred for other reasons (such as the appropriate treatment of a dynamic structure). For all 
these reasons, regressors were still instrumentalised, and both the OLS and GMM results are 
discussed in this paper.8 
 
                                                 
7
 In fact, to the extent that there could be a causal relationship from profitability to concentration, this might be a 
negative relationship, insofar as high levels of aggregate profitability could encourage entry, leading to rising 
competition and lower levels of concentration. If this type of simultaneity were present, then the positive 
relationship between concentration and profitability could even be understated. 
8
 It should be noted that the consistency obtained through IV estimation (if the use of instruments is indeed 
warranted) does come at a cost of a loss of efficiency relative to OLS, particularly if the instruments used are only 
weakly relevant to the regressors being instrumentalised, since the asymptotic variance of the IV estimator is 
inevitably larger than that of the OLS estimator.  
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In addition to OLS, relationships were thus estimated using three different GMM methods. 
Firstly, a standard two-step efficient GMM estimator was implemented which minimises the 
GMM criterion function g*W*g*NJ ′=   where N is the sample size, g are the orthogonality or 
moment conditions(which specify that all exogenous variables or instruments in the equation are 
uncorrelated with the error term) and W is a weighting matrix. The GMM estimator with the 
optimal weighting matrix that minimises the asymptotic variance of the estimator, is the efficient 
GMM estimator. In the case of two-step efficient GMM, the optimal weighting matrix is the 
inverse of an estimate of the covariance matrix of orthogonality conditions.   
 
If the model is exactly identified, and if the assumptions of conditional homoskedasticity and 
independence hold, there would be no difference between the efficient GMM estimator and the 
traditional IV/2SLS estimators. However, the efficient GMM estimator is more efficient through 
the use of the optimal weighting matrix and insofar as the model is overidentified and where the 
i.i.d. assumption needs to be relaxed. 
 
The two-step efficient GMM estimator was implemented in both static and dynamic 
specifications. Robust estimates were obtained through the Eicker-Huber-White ‘sandwich’ 
robust variance-covariance matrix for the IV estimator.  
 
Secondly, the Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator was used in implementing ‘difference GMM’. 
This approach treats the model as a system of equations differing only in their moment condition 
sets, with one equation for each quarter. Strictly exogenous regressors and other instruments 
enter the instrument matrix in first differences, with one column per instrument, as usual with 
instrumental variables. Variables that are specified as either predetermined or endogenous enter 
the model in first differences and are instrumented with appropriate lags of their own levels. The 
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimator is thus derived using lagged levels of the dependent 
variable as well as the predetermined and (originally) endogenous variables and differences of 
the strictly exogenous variables.  
 
This method was implemented with both the one- and two-step estimator, and the results were 
generally very similar. However, it should be noted that although the two-step estimates are 
asymptotically more efficient, the estimates of the standard errors have been found to be 
downward biased. Arellano and Bond thus recommend the use of the one-step estimators for 
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inference. The results reported here for the Arellano-Bond estimations are from the one-step 
procedures. 
 
The third method used was the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond method of ‘system GMM’, the 
basis of which was laid by Arellano and Bover (1995) and which was fully developed in 
Blundell and Bond (1998). This method improves on the original Arellano-Bond method, a 
limitation of which is that the lagged levels used in the construction of the difference GMM 
estimator may be poor instruments for the first difference form in which the variables enter the 
system of equations. The improvement introduced by Arellano and Bover (1995) was thus to 
bring in additional moment conditions by also including the original equations in the system, 
thus increasing efficiency. The levels of predetermined and endogenous variables are thus 
instrumented with appropriate lags of their own first differences, in addition to the lagged levels 
being used as instruments for the first differences – hence the characterisation of ‘system GMM’.  
 
Both the one- and two-step estimators were implemented in system GMM. Further, a finite-
sample correction was made to the two-step covariance matrix derived by Windmeijer (2005). 
This correction has been shown to significantly improve accuracy, and can make the two-step 
estimator more efficient that the one-step when the robust estimator of the covariance matrix of 
the parameter estimates is calculated. This can thus yield estimates robust to both 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation as well as with the appropriate finite sample correction.    
 
As part of the post-estimation testing, various methods of outlier identification were used9 and 
the baseline regressions rerun excluding the outliers identified through each method. This step 
was important, particularly given the heterogeneity of the dataset, in order to verify that the 
results were not simply outlier driven. The baseline results were found to be consistently robust 
(with minor variations) with all outlier identification methods used. Having confirmed this, the 
regressions were then run with the full dataset. 
 
 
                                                 
9
 The outlier identification methods used were the Cook, leverage, covratio, dfbeta, dfits, Rstandard, and Rstudent 
methods.  
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5.3   Specification and Results 
 
5.3.1 Baseline and dynamic specifications  
 
The baseline specification is as follows: 
t,itit,i9t,i8
t,i7t,i6t,i5
2
t,i4t,i3t,i2
x
t,I10
m
t,i
PETIATA
CDTACAOPEFFTAlnTAlnMSconc
ε+γ+α+β+β+
β+β+β+β+β+β+β+β=pi
 
 
This regresses profitability (measured as either ROA or ROE) on five explanatory  variables: the 
concentration index (‘conc1’ or ‘conc2’), market share, log of total assets, the quadratic of the 
log of total assets, and the measure of operational inefficiency; and four additional ‘control’ 
variables: the capital-asset ratio, ratio of cash and due from banks to total assets, the ratio of total 
invested assets to total assets, and the price-earnings ratio; as well as 2-way fixed effects by bank 
and by time (quarter).10 
 
The primary purpose of this specification is to test the relationship between concentration and 
profitability. The specification is designed to simultaneously test the four competing hypotheses 
in the literature – the structure-conduct-performance, relative market power, scale-efficiency and 
X-efficiency – by nesting all four hypothesis in the specification. Further, this specification 
allows stronger conclusions to be drawn from a finding concerning concentration (which is the 
main variable of interest in this paper) as it suggests that any apparent relationship between 
concentration and profitability may indeed be a genuine causal one, as opposed to a spurious 
correlation arising from a causal relationship associated with one of the other three hypotheses. 
A positive and statistically significant coefficient on concentration (‘conc1’ or ‘conc2’), even 
when market share, size, and operational efficiency are controlled for, would thus suggest that 
concentration has an effect in its own right on profitability, and that an apparent positive 
relationship is not spurious; this could be interpreted as supportive of the Structure-Conduct-
Performance (SCP) hypothesis.  
 
A positive and significant coefficient on market share (‘MS’) could be associated with the 
Relative Market Power (RMP) hypothesis, and would suggest that a bank’s market share has a 
positive effect on its profitability, and that (if no independent effect of concentration is found) 
                                                 
10
 Note that each variable is discussed more fully in section 4.2 as well as in Appendix 1. 
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any apparent relationship between concentration and profitability is actually just a reflection of 
the association between high market shares of the large individual banks and concentrated 
market structure. Further, a positive and statistically significant coefficient on market share even 
with the measure of operational efficiency in the specification, would suggest that – in addition 
to the generic structural effects of concentration on profitability – a bank’s individual market 
share is significant even when its operational efficiency is controlled for. 
 
A positive and statistically significant coefficient on the size variable ‘lnTA’ could be interpreted 
as supportive of the scale efficiency hypothesis, suggesting that large banks enjoy important 
economies of scale and it is this dynamic that may produce an apparent yet spurious relationship 
between market structure and profitability. The measure of size (‘lnTA’) is included in both the 
linear and quadratic form. The reason for this specification is a hypothesis, derived from the 
existing literature and empirical evidence, that banks realize economies of scale only up to a 
certain point, after which there may even actually be diseconomies of scale. A negative and 
significant estimated coefficient on ‘lnTA2’, especially if the turning point of the regression were 
found to be at a relatively low size threshold, would however go against the scale efficiency 
hypothesis.  
 
Finally, a negative and significant coefficient on ‘OPEFF’ would be supportive of the X-
efficiency hypothesis: if operational efficiency were a significant determinant of bank 
profitability, one would expect a negative coefficient on this variable. (Note that the way that this 
variable is constructed thus actually measures operational inefficiency.) 
 
The SCP hypothesis would thus predict a positive and significant coefficient on ‘conc’, but 
would not be associated with explicit predictions concerning the other explanatory variables. The 
RMP hypothesis would predict a positive and significant coefficient on the ‘MS’ variable, and 
does not require any particular results in terms of the other variables. The scale efficiency 
hypothesis would predict a positive and significant coefficient on ‘lnTA’, would not predict a 
negative (and significant) coefficient on ‘lnTA2’ (at least not at a low turning point), and would 
predict that positive and significant coefficients would not be found on ‘conc’ or on ‘MS’. The 
X-efficiency hypothesis would predict a negative and significant coefficient on ‘OPEFF’ and 
would predict that that the coefficients on ‘conc’ and ‘MS’ would not be positive and significant. 
Note that the latter two hypotheses predict that including the relevant variables in the 
37 
 
specification (size in the case of the scale efficiency hypothesis and operational efficiency in the 
case of the X-efficiency hypothesis) would collapse any apparent relationship between 
concentration and either profitability or bank market shares. 
 
The regressions were run with two different measures of the dependent variable profitability – 
return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Some studies in the literature use one or the 
other of these measures, as they measure slightly different concepts, and both sets of results are 
presented here.  
 
Further, two different measures of concentration are used as the explanatory variable of primary 
interest. A detailed explanation of the construction of these indices is given elsewhere in this 
paper, but essentially ‘conc1’ measures concentration among the top (i.e. largest) 2% of 
commercial banks and savings institutions respectively that are in the sample, while ‘conc2’ is a 
somewhat broader measure of the degree of concentration among the top 5%. The concentration 
indices were constructed in a new and arguably superior way to the measures usually used in 
such studies. One advantage of the new proposed measures is that they give a better sense of the 
depth and intensity of concentration than the CRx measures typically used in the literature.11 The 
concentration indices incorporate the asset shares of each of the banks within the top 2% or 5% 
respectively, weighted so that the largest banks within the top 2% or 5%, rather than simply the 
cumulative asset share of the top x banks as typically used in the CRx measures.  
 
Tables 2-8 show the results for the baseline specification, using OLS estimation, dynamic OLS 
(with one or four LDVs), with 2-step efficient GMM, with 1-step dynamic Arellano-Bond 
GMM, and with two-step dynamic Arellano-Bond/Blundell-Bover GMM. 
 
Both measures of concentration have positive and highly statistically significant estimated 
coefficients in all OLS specifications – with both measures of profitability (ROA and ROE) as 
the dependent variable, and in the static as well as both dynamic specifications. The coefficients 
on ‘conc2’ (the 5% measure of concentration) tend to be slightly higher than on ‘conc1’ (the 
                                                 
11
 Note that, as discussed further below, the baseline OLS specification was rerun with the type of CRx measures 
typically used, and the results are very similar to those obtained with the conc1 and conc2 measures, demonstrating 
the robustness of the results and also that the results are not specific to the new concentration indices proposed. 
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narrower 2% measure). The estimated coefficients on market share (‘MS’) are also all positive 
and statistically significantly, possibly pointing to some market power effects.  
 
The estimated coefficients on ‘lnTA’ are consistently positive and statistically significant, while 
those on ‘lnTA2’ are consistently negative and statistically significant. This is an interesting 
result which is consistent with our theoretical priors, that banks do enjoy economies of scale but 
only up to a certain point. This issue is discussed in much more detail in Appendix 3, which also 
discusses the distribution of the actual sample in terms of the apparent parabolic relationship 
between size and profitability. 
 
The estimated coefficients on operational efficiency (expected to be negative) are marginally 
negative but close to zero (sometimes appearing as zero in the results due to rounding of decimal 
points), and statistically insignificant in the estimations with ROA but statistically significant 
with ROE (although the level of significance is diminished in the dynamic specifications).12  
 
The baseline specification in OLS was also rerun with the CRx measures typically used in the 
literature. A CR10 measure was used for commercial banks, and a CR3 measure for savings 
institutions (given the far smaller number of the latter both in the sample and in the entire 
population). The results are reported in table 2. Both the estimated coefficients and levels of 
significance are very close (in some cases even identical) to those for the baseline OLS 
specifications using ‘conc1’ and ‘conc2’, as reported in table 2.  
 
Considering the results of the baseline specification with both static and dynamic 2-step efficient 
GMM, the estimated coefficients on both concentration measures and for both profitability 
variables remain positive and significant, with a roughly similar order of magnitude as with the 
OLS estimation. Market share remains positive but is no longer statistically significant, and 
while the signs of the size variables are the same as with OLS, their statistical significance is 
dampened. Operational efficiency is now marginally negative (as would be expected) and 
statistically significant, especially with ROA.  
                                                 
12
 Further consideration could be given to whether an improved measure of operational efficiency could be 
developed in future research. 
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The results from the one-step Arellano-Bond and the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond dynamic 
GMM methods are consistent in signs and statistical significance with the other estimation 
methods (but note that all variable are in their first-differenced form in the former). Note that the 
estimated coefficients on both the first difference of concentration and on the level remain 
positive and highly statistically significant for both measures of concentration and of 
profitability.  
 
Summing up the results from all four methods using the baseline specification, the finding of a 
positive and highly significant coefficient on concentration, and the robustness of this finding, 
suggests that what is important is the market structure of the sector and that this relationship is 
not just a manifestation of higher market shares of large banks, through economies of scale, or 
through superior efficiency of large banks. With reference to the existing literature, this result 
provides strong support for the SCP hypothesis over the RMP, X-efficiency and scale-efficiency 
hypotheses. It suggests that the market structure of the banking sector – specifically, the degree 
of concentration at the top end of the banking market – has effects in its own right on 
profitability, not merely through channels such as economies of scale, nor as a common outcome 
of an underlying determinant such as market share. 
 
The R2 statistics are generally rather low.13 Although this is somewhat disappointing, it is worth 
noting that the related literature typically finds rather low R2 statistics in these sorts of tests. 
Further, the specification focuses on the market structure and industrial organisation 
determinants of profitability, and could potentially be underspecified with respect to other 
determinants of profitability. The inclusion of additional control variables (results not reported 
here) did raise the R2 somewhat, but this had the disadvantage of reducing the sample due to 
poorer coverage of these variables, and would probably have biased the sample as well. 
 
Interpreting the economic significance of the results is critical to understanding the strength of 
the relationship between concentration and profitability and the degree of importance of any 
implications for the real economy. Given the way in which the concentration indices are 
                                                 
13
 Note that not all the methods used report a R2 statistic. 
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constructed, were each bank included in the concentration indices (that is, the largest 2% of 
banks in each quarter for ‘conc1’ and the largest 5% for ‘conc2’) to increase their asset share by 
x% of their current share, the concentration index would rise by x%. (For example, a 5% rise in 
asset shares would mean, for the first quarter of 1994, the largest bank’s asset share increasing 
from 6.272% to 6.585%, or that of the 20th largest bank rising from 0.324% to 0.340%, and the 
concentration indices rising by 5%.) The effects of a change in the asset shares of the largest 
banks on the concentration indices and hence, based on the estimated coefficients on the 
concentration indices, on profitability, can thus be calculated.  
 
The results of this exercise are summarised in table 9, for two estimation methods (OLS and two-
step Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond dynamic GMM, for which the estimated coefficients differ 
in size) using the baseline specification, for both ROA and ROE as the dependent variable, and 
with each of ‘conc1’ and ‘conc2’ as the explanatory variable of interest. Based on the estimated 
coefficients on ‘conc1’ and ‘conc2’, the increase in profitability (ROA or ROE) that would be 
associated with a 5% or 10% increase in the asset share of each institution included in the 
concentration indices, are shown. The increases in profitability are also shown as a percentage of 
mean ROA or ROE respectively, to give a sense of their relative magnitude. For example, a 10% 
increase in the asset share of the largest 2% of institutions (as a percentage of their actual asset 
share in each quarter) would mean a 10% rise in ‘conc1’, which would be associated with (using 
the GMM estimated coefficients) increases in ROA and ROE respectively equal to 1.184% and 
1.12% of mean profitability.  
 
In economic terms, these effects are not particularly high. However, they do seem to be credible: 
given the range of determinants of an individual bank’s profitability, a macro variable such as the 
level of concentration would probably not be expected to have a very high absolute effect. Note 
that the increases in profitability associated with increases in concentration are broadly similar 
for ROA and ROE as a percentage of mean ROA or ROE, (although mostly slightly higher for 
ROE). Further, the effects are slightly higher for ‘conc2’ (the broader concentration index) than 
for ‘conc1’. 
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5.3.2 Re-estimation excluding banks included in the concentration indices 
 
Next, the above specifications are re-estimated for a sample excluding those banks whose asset 
shares are included in the construction of the concentration indices – that is, the largest 2% of 
each type of institution in each quarter in the case of ‘conc1’ and the largest 5% for ‘conc2’. One 
objective of this exercise is to further verify that the apparent relationship running from 
concentration to profitability does not derive simply from a correlation between large banks 
being more profitable and having a large market share, showing up in a higher concentration 
index, without any necessary structural relationship between concentration and overall 
profitability.  
 
The second object of this step is to begin to investigate the channels of the concentration-
profitability relationship, by considering whether the positive overall relationship between 
concentration and profitability is just operating through increased profitability of the top banks, 
which shows up when the relationship is tested for the entire sector, or alternatively whether 
concentration has positive effects on profitability of the sector as a whole. That is, to what extent 
is the enhanced profitability of the top banks, arising from their greater share of the overall 
banking market, at the expense of the rest of the banking sector, and/or to what extent does it 
also enhance the profitability of the rest of the sector?  
 
The results from these regressions (using all four econometric techniques) are shown in tables 
10-13. The coefficient on concentration is again positive and highly statistically significant in all 
sixteen estimations reported in the tables below excluding the large banks whose market shares 
are included in the respective concentration indices (i.e. for both profitability measures, both 
concentration indices, and all four estimation techniques). This result suggests that the overall 
positive relationship between concentration and profitability is not just a reflection of the 
positive effects of concentration at the top on the profitability of the top banks, but that 
concentration is actually affecting the profitability of the sector as a whole. 
 
This is a particularly striking result given the indeterminate and possibly contradictory effects of 
higher concentration at the top on the rest of the sector. It might be interpreted as suggesting that 
any ‘trickle-down’ effects of the benefits to the top banks from higher concentration outweigh 
any negative effects on the profitability of the other banks, for example through the loss of 
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market share to the largest banks. Even though rising concentration would mean lower market 
share for the rest of the sector and potentially lower absolute profits, the profit rate is higher. 
 
This result also provides strong support for the SCP hypothesis over the RMP hypothesis. If the 
concentration-profitability relationship were operating through the advantages accruing directly 
to large banks through their own individual market shares, one would expect the apparent 
relationship between concentration and profitability to fall away when the large banks from 
whose asset shares the concentration indices are calculated, are excluded from the sample. The 
result of a robust positive relationship between concentration and profitability even when these 
banks are excluded points strongly towards a generic structural relationship between 
concentration and profitability. 
 
5.3.3 Disaggregation by bank size 
 
Next, the sample is disaggregated by bank size (measured as an institution’s total assets) in order 
to investigate the differential effects of concentration on profitability. The sample is broken 
down into quintiles, quartiles, and thirds for each quarter, with institutions being classified 
according to their assets in that particular quarter (such that the particular sample of institutions 
in each category may change over time as their relative size changes). The specification is re-
estimated by quintile, quartile, and third, for both concentration indices and for both measures of 
profitability. In each case quintile1/quartile1/third1 is the group of the smallest banks and 
quintile5/quartile4/third3 the largest. At this point these regressions have only been run with 
OLS. 
 
The results of these regressions are reported in tables 14-15 (quintiles), tables 16-17 (quartiles) 
and 18-19 (thirds), in each case with each of ‘conc1’ and ‘conc2’ as regressors. The estimated 
coefficients on both concentration measures are consistently positive, and the estimates are 
mostly but not always statistically significant. In most regressions one (or two in the quintiles 
disaggregations) of the middle-lower size categories are not statistically significant14. Comparing 
the size of the estimated coefficients on the concentration regressors across size categories, these 
are always highest for the category of the largest banks (quintile/quartile/third 1 respectively). 
                                                 
14
 The estimated coefficients on concentration are not statistically significant even at the 10% level in the regressions 
with quintiles 2 and/or 3, in one case with quartile 2, and in some cases with the middle third.  
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For some size disaggregations (such as by thirds) the next highest estimated coefficients are for 
the smallest group and the lowest are for the middle group. For other size disaggregations (such 
as by quintiles) the estimated coefficient for the second largest group of banks is the second 
largest. 
 
Summarising the results in terms of statistical significance and size of estimated coefficients on 
concentration across these 45 regressions across disaggregations of banks by size, a general 
picture seems to emerge of a strong positive relationship for the largest banks and large banks in 
the next tier or so, as well as for the smallest banks. The results are generally weak for a section 
of banks in the small-medium range of the size spectrum. These findings do make some 
economic sense. To the extent that high levels of concentration may facilitate collusive-type 
behaviour among the largest banks and allow them to extract higher profits (through interest and 
or non-interest channels, as discussed further below), the benefits of this may ‘trickle down’ to 
banks in the next tier(s) who are concomitantly able, for example, to pay lower rates on deposits 
or charge higher rates on loans. Furthermore, the industrial organisation literature often suggests 
that the smallest firms benefit significantly from concentrated markets, as they are pulled along 
by the price-setting behaviour or larger firms. However, the mixed results for middle-sized banks  
could perhaps arise from the combination of some benefits from being ‘pulled along’ on the one 
hand, while on the other hand the negative effects of being outside the direct benefits of 
collusive-type behaviour at the top. The smallest firms, on the other hand, are less likely to be 
direct competitors of the largest banks, and this could explain the positive results observed for 
them. For instance, these might be small local banks or niche banks that are in less direct 
competition with the large national banks than would be the case for medium-sized national 
banks.  
 
5.3.4 Investigation of components and channels of profitability 
 
The next line of investigation regards the ‘channels’ through which the apparent relationship 
between concentration and profitability operates. This can potentially shed light on some of the 
more qualitative and causal issues that the baseline regressions do not completely answer. Such 
an analysis is also germane to potential effects of bank concentration on the broader economy, 
and to any policy implications of this research, for which it would be important to understand the 
mechanisms through which the relationship operates and where the ‘additional’ profits realized 
through higher levels of concentration can in some sense be understood to have derived from. 
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However, such analysis does not appear to be extensively developed in the literature, and hence 
this research can potentially make a contribution in this regard. 
 
Two lines of investigation were pursued in this part of the investigation. Firstly, the two 
measures of profitability were disaggregated into their four basic components as follows, and 
each of the components specified as the dependent variable. The object is to establish through 
which component(s) of profitability the concentration-profitability relationship operates. The 
components of ROA and ROE – these components being specified as the dependent variables in 
the next sets of regressions – are as follows: 
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assetstotal
incomeother
assetstotal
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assetstotal
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Tables 20-23 show the results of estimation – using the same four econometric techniques of 
OLS, two-step efficient GMM, one-step Arellano-Bond dynamic GMM, and two-step Arellano-
Bover/Blundell-Bond dynamic GMM – for the first two components of each of the two 
profitability ratios above, that is,  
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Tables 24-27 show the results with the other two components of the two profitability ratios as 
above, that is,  
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The results for these regressions are not entirely conclusive, and further investigation in this area 
is required. However, particularly when the estimated coefficients on the concentration variables 
are statistically significant, they are indeed of the expected signs: positive estimated coefficients 
on the concentration indices when the dependent variables are total gross interest income or other 
income over either total assets or total equity capital, and negative estimated coefficients on the 
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concentration indices when the dependent variables are interest expense or other expense over 
either total assets or total equity capital. These results suggest that the effects of concentration on 
bank profitability may operate through all four components of profitability. This further bolsters 
a conclusion of a causal relationship from concentration to profitability. However, the 
unevenness of the results when the results using the various econometric techniques used are 
compared – mostly in terms of differing levels of statistical significance, and in a few cases even 
of sign – suggests that further investigation is required in this regard. 
 
The second line of analysis in terms of the intermediate variables and channels of profitability is 
on the effects of concentration on interest rates paid by the bank, received by the bank, and the 
difference between these (the interest rate spread). Note that the deposit and lending interest rates 
calculated here are ‘effective’ rates, in that they are not the nominal rates actually charged/paid 
by the banks, but are based on the interest actually received or paid (such that defaults on loans 
are also taken account of).  
 
Each of these three variables was specified as the dependent variable and estimated with the 
same four econometric techniques. These three variables are defined as follows: 
 
depositstotal
depositsonerestint
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Tables 28-31 show the results from regressions in which the dependent variables are the deposit 
interest rate, lending interest rate, and interest rate spread, respectively. 
 
Both concentration indices have a negative (except in the case of the Arellano-Bond results, 
which is in first differences) and generally statistically significant coefficient in explaining the 
deposit interest rate, and positive and statistically significant coefficients in explaining both the 
lending interest rate and the interest rate spread. These results suggest that relatively high levels 
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of concentration may allow banks to increase their interest rate spread both at the expense of 
depositors and of borrowers, a potentially very significant result.  
 
However, it must be noted that the sample size for these regressions is restricted – and probably 
in a biased fashion – owing to the poor coverage of certain data items needed in the calculation 
of these ratios (although still yielding over 2 500 valid observations for each regression15), and 
this unfortunately diminishes the weight that can be attached to these results. 
 
Overall, the results of the estimation on the various intermediate variables are supportive of the 
overall results discussed above concerning the relationship between concentration and 
profitability. Moreover, it appears that the relationship operates through interest rates on both 
lending and borrowings, as well as through both interest and non-interest channels. 
 
This analysis is important in understanding the effects of concentration in the banking sector on 
the real economy, notably in terms of accumulation as well as distribution. The interest rate 
spread can be thought of as a wedge between deposit and lending rates, transferring resources to 
banks rather than productive investment. The effects of concentration-depressed interest rates on 
deposits on savings would depend on the interest elasticity of savings. If savings were 
completely interest inelastic, the lower interest rates on deposits associated with higher rates of 
competition would mean a transfer from depositors to banks. The more interest elastic were 
savings, in addition to these distributional effects there would also be lower rates of savings 
and/or financial disintermediation. On the other side, the higher interest rates on lending 
associated with higher levels of concentration could likely have more direct negative effects on 
investment and growth. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper has investigated the effects of concentration on profitability in the US banking sector 
between 1994 and 2005. A strongly significant positive relationship is found – even with the 
inclusion of regressors associated with an individual bank’s market share, size, and operational 
efficiency – which supports for the Structure-Conduct-Performance hypothesis of a structural 
                                                 
15
 Fewer observations for the GMM regressions due to the lag structures. 
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relationship between overall concentration and profitability. This is an important finding, and 
suggests that concentration in the banking sector does have a positive effect on profitability in 
the entire banking sector, even when controlling for individual bank market share, size, and 
operational efficiency. The implication is that bank concentration raises profitability in a 
generalised, structural way – rather than simply as an outcome of banks’ individual market 
power associated with their own market shares, or with economies of scale or the benefits 
associated with higher operational efficiency simply manifesting in higher concentration.  
 
Some support is also found for the RMP hypothesis, as the estimated coefficients on ‘MS’ are 
also consistently positive and statistically significant. Economies of scale are found up to a 
certain point, but the evidence suggests that the scale-efficiency hypothesis is not valid for the 
sample. The analysis does not show support for the X-efficiency hypothesis. 
 
The relationship found between concentration and profitability is robust to various econometric 
techniques used:  OLS (both static and dynamic); two-step efficient GMM; dynamic Arellano-
Bond GMM; and two-step dynamic Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond GMM. Further, it is robust to 
two alternative measures of concentration used (one including the asset share of the largest 2% 
of commercial banks and savings institutions respectively in each quarter, and the other 
including the largest 5%), as well as to both measures of profitability specified as the dependent 
variable (ROA and ROE).  
 
This conclusion that the relationship between concentration and profitability operates in a 
generalised structural way is bolstered by the persistence of a robust positive relationship 
between concentration and profitability even when those banks whose asset shares are included 
in the construction of the concentration indices were excluded. This is a new test, which 
contributes to our understanding of the relationship between concentration and profitability. The 
results support the hypothesis that the concentration-profitability relationship operates not simply 
through inflated profits of those dominant banks, but that the payoffs of concentration are felt in 
the banking sector more broadly. These results thus provide strong support for a generalised 
structural and causal relationship between bank concentration and profitability, and for the SCP 
over the RMP hypothesis. They could also suggest that the enhanced bank profits associated with 
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higher bank concentration come primarily at the expense of non-banking sectors rather than a 
‘redistribution’ within the banking sector.16  
 
The baseline specification was also re-estimated for various subsamples of banks disaggregated 
by size. The object of this exercise is simply to test differences in the relationships for different 
sizes of banks, and the results are helpful in understanding how the relationships operate for 
different sizes of banks, and shedding further light on the relationship between concentration 
amongst the largest banks and the profitability of the rest of the sector. The benefits of 
concentration are highest for the largest banks and those in the next largest tier, as well as for the 
smallest banks, but with no clear results for lower-middle-sized banks. We suggest that this 
might be because while some of the benefits of concentration at the top trickle down to middle-
sized banks, they could also be negatively affected by concentration at the top which places them 
at a competitive disadvantage. The smallest banks, on the other hand, are less likely to be direct 
competitors to the largest banks (as they may rely primarily on local or niche advantages) but 
might still gain some of the benefits of concentration in terms of overall profitability of the 
banking sector. 
 
The final aspect of the empirical analysis was to investigate the effects of concentration on 
separate components of profitability, in order to shed light on the channels through which the 
relationship between concentration and profitability operates. Firstly whether concentration 
affects profitability through the interest and/or non-interest items of banks’ balance sheets; 
secondly whether concentration affects profitability through the income and/or expense items of 
banks’ balance sheets; and thirdly whether concentration affects the interest rates paid by banks 
on deposits, those charged by banks on loans, and/or banks’ interest rate spreads. Although the 
findings in this regard are not entirely conclusive, several interesting results emerge. Firstly, 
concentration appears to raise profitability through both the interest and non-interest sides of 
banks’ balance sheets. Secondly, concentration appears to affect profitability through both the 
income and expense sides of banks’ balance sheets, that is, raising bank income and lowering 
bank expenses. Thirdly, concentration appears to lower the (effective) deposit interest rate and 
raise both the (effective) lending interest rate and the (effective) interest rate spread. 
                                                 
16
 Furthermore, in reference to the broader IO and game theoretic literature, it may tentatively suggest that a group 
of the largest banks are colluding (or in game theoretic terms, playing the colluding game), while others are free-
riding on this. 
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The finding that bank concentration is associated with higher bank profitability, as well as the 
results that concentration is associated with higher lending rates and lower rates on deposits, 
could have significant implications for the real economy. Firstly, there are distributional 
implications in terms of a transfer of resources from depositors and/or borrowers to banks. 
Secondly, lower interest rates on deposits could reduce the rate of savings, with the extent of this 
depending on the interest elasticity of deposits. Thirdly, in a related effect, higher interest rates 
on loans could depress investment and growth. These results thus suggest that concentration in 
the banking sector could potentially exacerbate credit rationing and constrain accumulation and 
growth. 
 
These results suggest the need for stronger regulation of concentration in the banking sector. The 
typical arguments advanced as to the benefits of concentration in the industrial sector – such as 
enhanced competitiveness, facilitation of innovation, and economies of scale – do not necessarily 
apply to the banking sector, particular as it appears that economies of scale in banking only 
prevail up to a certain size (which is below that of the large banks in the sample). 
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Appendix 1: More information on selected variables 
 
This section provides greater detail on the construction of the variables than that provided in the 
main text, where necessary. 
 
Concentration ( x t,Iconc ) 
 
1
t,Iconc  is an index of the weighted share of the largest 2% of institutions in sector I (by quarter) 
of aggregate total assets of sector I, and 2 t,Iconc  similarly for the largest 5% of each type of 
institutions in each quarter. These are new indices developed in this paper. The specific 
institutions included in each measure thus vary by quarter. The two sectors are commercial banks 
and savings institutions. This division was necessary in order to avoid collinearity problems 
arising from a variable being uniform across banks for every period, in models with time fixed 
effects.17 The measures of aggregate total assets are derived from the FDIC statistics of the entire 
sectors, rather than the sample of the Bank Compustat database.  
 
The indices were calculated as follows: 
{ }
N
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where ASi,t is the assets of institution i in quarter t as a share of the aggregate (FDIC-reported) 
assets for the relevant sector (commercial banks or savings institutions) in that quarter; 
and 
N is the number of institutions in the largest two percentiles of institutions of sector i in 
the case of 1 t,Iconc , or the largest five percentiles in the case of 
2
t,Iconc . 
The weighting in the concentration indices is thus that the asset share of the largest institution in 
each quarter is counted N times, the second largest institution counted (N-1) times, and so on, 
such that the asset share of the Nth institution is counted once. 
                                                 
17
 An alternative that was considered was to construct separate concentration indices for different geographical 
regions. However, in addition to the problem that banks do compete interregionally (particularly since the full 
implementation of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, this approach would have 
meant the loss of close to half the banks in the sample, no doubt with a selection bias in this as well, as many banks 
did not have a valid geographical code in the dataset. 
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The difference between 1 t,Iconc and 
2
t,Iconc  is thus that the latter is a somewhat broader measure, 
as it includes the asset shares of the largest 5% of institutions as opposed to the largest 2% in the 
case of 1 t,Iconc . 
 
This measure improves on measures of concentration typically used in the literature, such as 
CR1, CR3, CR5, C7, or CR10. These measures do not give a sense of the ‘depth’ or intensity of 
concentration among the n banks. Such measures are also unduly sensitive to changes such as 
mergers and acquisitions at the threshold of n banks. 
 
Market share (MS,t) 
 
Note that this denoted the share of institution i in the aggregate net income as reported by the 
FDIC for quarter t, rather than the total net income of institutions in the Bank Compustat dataset. 
 
Size (lnTAi,t and (lnTAi,t)2 ) 
 
Total assets were deflated (using a quarterly GDP deflator) and then the natural log taken, and 
the measure squared in the case of (lnTAi,t)2. 
 
Operational inefficiency (OPEFFi,t) 
 
This is the ratio of an institution’s total other expenses (including salaries and wages of officers 
and employees, pension and employment benefits, (net) occupancy expense of bank premises, 
total costs of furniture and equipment, and other current operating expenses) to net income in 
quarter t. 
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Appendix 2: Tables of Results 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs 
 
Dependent variables:           
ROA overall 0.4087 0.2970 -3.6067 7.7170 N = 20796 
 between  0.1686 0.0090 1.4154 n =     644 
  within   0.2452 -4.0596 6.7103 T = 32.29 
ROE overall 4.5303 3.2568 -48.0378 60.7970 N = 20781 
 between  1.8587 0.0254 14.4487 n =     644 
  within   2.6989 -45.2800 57.8542 T = 32.27 
TGIITA overall 0.0094 0.0078 -0.0092 0.5867 N = 20775 
 between  0.0034 0.0016 0.0345 n =     644 
  within   0.0069 -0.0220 0.5617 T = 32.26 
TGIIE overall 0.1097 0.0786 -2.0938 1.2708 N = 20760 
 between  0.0487 0.0146 0.3633 n =     644 
  within   0.0598 -2.2019 1.1204 T =  32.24 
interest expense/total assets overall 0.0077 0.0064 0.0000 0.5229 N = 20790 
 between  0.0020 0.0009 0.0306 n =     644 
  within   0.0060 -0.0195 0.5000 T = 32.28 
interest expense/equity overall 0.0892 0.0628 -2.0938 1.2423 N = 20775 
 between  0.0341 0.0137 0.3794 n =     644 
  within   0.0528 -2.2029 0.9578 T = 32.26 
Other income/total assets overall 0.0033 0.0054 -0.0177 0.2955 N = 20781 
 between  0.0035 0.0000 0.0403 n =     644 
  within   0.0039 -0.0442 0.2588 T = 32.27 
other income/total equity overall 0.0383 0.0662 -2.2027 2.8547 N = 20766 
 between  0.0402 0.0003 0.4833 n =     644 
  within   0.0504 -2.6477 2.5972 T = 32.25 
other expenses/total assets overall -0.0081 0.0064 -0.4332 0.0188 N = 20780 
 between  0.0031 -0.0347 -0.0012 n =     644 
  within   0.0055 -0.4067 0.0454 T = 32.27 
other expenses/equity overall -0.0938 0.0734 -2.7806 0.4130 N = 20765 
 between  0.0450 -0.5569 -0.0091 n =     644 
  within   0.0573 -2.5702 0.8761 T = 32.24 
deposit interest rate overall 0.0070 0.0038 0.0009 0.0612 N =   2535 
 between  0.0018 0.0036 0.0132 n =      58 
  within   0.0034 -0.0010 0.0586 T = 43.71 
lending interest rate overall 0.0209 0.0073 0.0032 0.1666 N =   2529 
 between  0.0033 0.0133 0.0324 n =      58 
  within   0.0065 0.0063 0.1572 T = 43.60 
interest rate spread overall 0.0139 0.0047 -0.0141 0.1054 N =   2526 
 between  0.0028 0.0063 0.0214 n =      58 
 within  0.0038 -0.0114 0.0986 T = 43.55 
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Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs 
 
Explanatory variables:           
conc1 overall 2.5587 1.1568 1.0000 7.4609 N = 20796 
 between  0.9803 1.9270 5.3679 n =     644 
  within   0.7543 -0.7167 5.5715 T = 32.29 
conc2 overall 2.4446 1.0973 1.0000 5.3652 N = 20796 
 between  0.9417 1.8437 5.1321 n =     644 
  within   0.7007 -0.6024 4.5976 T = 32.29 
CRa overall 2.5223 1.1953 1.0000 5.7813 N = 20796 
 between  1.0361 1.8724 5.4800 n =    644 
 within  0.7532 -0.7891 4.9269 T = 32.29 
MS overall 0.0686 0.4353 -5.5359 13.7505 N = 20794 
 between  0.2960 -0.0001 4.4559 n =     644 
  within   0.2664 -7.0409 9.6962 T = 32.29 
lnTA overall 6.9398 1.6143 2.6614 13.9045 N = 20796 
 between  1.4721 4.0027 13.5855 n =     644 
  within   0.3910 4.1364 9.4230 T = 32.29 
lnTA2 overall 50.7668 25.8206 7.0830 193.3345 N = 20796 
 between  23.1272 16.0234 184.6028 n =     644 
  within   5.9213 11.4214 85.3308 T = 32.29 
OPEFF overall 372.0091 2340.2640 -68158.82 142438.50 N = 20773 
 between  519.1217 -4401.145 4021.2810 n =    644 
 within  2292.5700 -66714.57 139277.90 T = 32.26 
 
Control variables:           
CA overall 9.6050 3.8524 -1.3291 97.7792 N = 20781 
 between  3.1814 3.3409 31.2604 n =     644 
  within   2.3754 -18.2690 95.6610 T = 32.27 
CDTA overall 4.1871 3.0869 -0.1259 36.2589 N = 20777 
 between  2.5098 0.4800 30.2728 n =     644 
  within   1.8485 -6.4522 28.0357 T = 32.26 
TIATA overall 89.6251 7.4875 0.0000 98.7520 N = 20796 
 between  6.0563 19.7485 97.9560 n =     644 
  within   4.3991 -1.5057 137.1648 T = 32.29 
PE overall 60.6667 105.5963 -2951.00 3031.000 N = 20148 
 between  53.0205 -625.00 874.4778 n =     644 
  within   100.3362 -2874.046 2757.8650 T = 31.29 
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Table 2: Baseline specification with OLS 
Depvar ROA ROE ROA ROE 
conc1 0.0253 0.3678   
 [0.000] [0.000]   
conc2   0.0263 0.3825 
   [0.000] [0.000] 
MS 0.1039 1.3414 0.1039 1.3417 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
lnTA 0.1031 1.5066 0.1027 1.5009 
 [0.003] [0.000] [0.004] [0.000] 
lnTA2 -0.0111 -0.1235 -0.0111 -0.1232 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
OPEFF 0 0.0002 0 0.0002 
 [0.658] [0.002] [0.657] [0.002] 
CA 0.0152 -0.1602 0.0151 -0.1607 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
CDTA -0.0008 0.0603 -0.0007 0.0612 
 [0.721] [0.002] [0.742] [0.002] 
TIATA -0.0009 0.0614 -0.0009 0.0613 
 [0.529] [0.000] [0.528] [0.000] 
PE 0 -0.002 0 -0.002 
 [0.531] [0.000] [0.532] [0.000] 
Constant 0.0846 -5.093 0.0855 -5.0795 
 [0.633] [0.005] [0.630] [0.006] 
Obs 20112 20112 20112 20112 
# banks 644 644 644 644 
R-sq 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 
Robust p values in brackets  
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Table 3: Baseline specification with OLS, using standard CR10/CR3 measures of concentration 
  ROA ROE 
CRa 0.0239 0.3491 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
MSi 0.1039 1.3417 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
lnTA 0.1029 1.5044 
 [0.003] [0.000] 
lnTA2 -0.0111 -0.1234 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
OPEFF 0 0.0002 
 [0.658] [0.002] 
CA 0.0152 -0.1604 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
CDTA -0.0007 0.061 
 [0.739] [0.002] 
TIATA -0.0009 0.0614 
 [0.529] [0.000] 
PE 0 -0.002 
 [0.532] [0.000] 
Constant 0.0868 -5.067 
  [0.624] [0.006] 
Obs 20112 20112 
# banks 644 644 
R-sq 0.07 0.08 
Robust p values in brackets 
 
Note: the CRa measure of concentration combines the CR10 measure in the case of commercial banks, and the CR3 
measure in the case of savings institutions (given the different number of banks in these two sectors). 
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Table 4: Dynamic baseline specification with OLS 
Depvar ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE 
L.depvar 0.2078 0.2582 0.2079 0.2583     
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]     
L4.depvar 
    0.0873 0.1291 0.0873 0.1292 
 
    [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
conc1 0.0228 0.2571   0.0359 0.3751   
 [0.000] [0.000]   [0.000] [0.000]   
conc2 
  0.0241 0.27   0.0378 0.3911 
 
  [0.000] [0.000]   [0.000] [0.000] 
MS 0.0899 1.2006 0.0899 1.2009 0.0952 1.2818 0.0952 1.2822 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
lnTA 0.1123 1.6365 0.1121 1.6334 0.0875 1.8513 0.0873 1.8476 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.017] [0.000] [0.017] [0.000] 
lnTA2 -0.0112 -0.1284 -0.0112 -0.1282 -0.0113 -0.1591 -0.0113 -0.1589 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
OPEFF 0 0.0002 0 0.0002 0 0.0002 0 0.0002 
 [0.449] [0.022] [0.448] [0.022] [0.564] [0.021] [0.563] [0.021] 
CA 0.0152 -0.1336 0.0151 -0.1339 0.0211 -0.1763 0.021 -0.1767 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
CDTA -0.0031 0.0306 -0.003 0.0311 -0.0018 0.0463 -0.0018 0.0474 
 [0.105] [0.060] [0.111] [0.055] [0.410] [0.024] [0.433] [0.021] 
TIATA -0.0013 0.0449 -0.0013 0.0449 -0.0016 0.0496 -0.0016 0.0496 
 [0.360] [0.000] [0.360] [0.000] [0.299] [0.000] [0.300] [0.000] 
PE 0 -0.0013 0 -0.0013 0 -0.0017 0 -0.0017 
 [0.960] [0.008] [0.959] [0.008] [0.639] [0.005] [0.640] [0.005] 
Constant 0.0122 -5.1949 0.0119 -5.1942 0.225 -5.0317 0.2258 -5.0347 
 [0.943] [0.001] [0.944] [0.001] [0.261] [0.014] [0.260] [0.014] 
Obs 19518 19510 19518 19510 17895 17882 17895 17882 
# banks 644 644 644 644 644 644 644 644 
R-sq 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.1 0.11 0.1 0.11 
Robust p values in brackets 
 
57 
 
Table 5: Baseline specification with 2-step efficient GMM 
Depvar ROA ROE ROA ROE 
conc1 0.0374 0.3002   
 [0.000] [0.000]   
conc2   0.0405 0.3242 
   [0.000] [0.000] 
MS 0.0051 0.1312 0.0051 0.1315 
 [0.66] [0.27] [0.66] [0.27] 
lnTA 0.0509 1.0071 0.0519 1.0105 
 [0.22] [0.034] [0.21] [0.033] 
lnTA2 -0.0046 -0.078 -0.0046 -0.0781 
 [0.087] [0.010] [0.082] [0.010] 
OPEFF -0.0003 -0.0012 -0.0003 -0.0012 
 [0.000] [0.031] [0.000] [0.032] 
CA 0.0067 -0.2518 0.0069 -0.2517 
 [0.075] [0] [0.069] [0] 
CDTA -0.005 -0.0306 -0.005 -0.0297 
 [0.14] [0.37] [0.14] [0.39] 
TIATA -0.0066 -0.0206 -0.0067 -0.0205 
 [0.000] [0.32] [0.000] [0.32] 
PE 0.0025 0.0141 0.0025 0.0141 
 [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.002] 
Obs 17118 17118 17118 17118 
# banks18 627 627 627 627 
Robust p values in brackets  
 
                                                 
18
 Where the number of banks varies between specifications, this is due to lag structures. The sample is however 
standard across specifications. 
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Table 6: Dynamic baseline specification with two-step efficient GMM 
Depvar ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE 
L.depvar 0.2026 0.24 0.2026 0.2401     
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]     
L4.depvar     0.0453 0.0718 0.0456 0.0714 
     [0.010] [0.001] [0.010] [0.0001] 
conc1 0.0302 0.2293   0.0363 0.2935   
 [0.000] [0.000]   [0.000] [0.000]   
conc2   0.0324 0.2487   0.0394 0.3169 
   [0.000] [0.000]   [0.000] [0.000] 
MS 0.015 0.2435 0.015 0.244 0.0024 0.0756 0.0024 0.0762 
 [0.13] [0.024] [0.13] [0.024] [0.83] [0.53] [0.83] [0.52] 
lnTA 0.0477 0.7003 0.0483 0.7026 0.0542 0.8929 0.0552 0.8969 
 [0.16] [0.070] [0.16] [0.069] [0.18] [0.059] [0.17] [0.058] 
lnTA2 -0.0043 -0.0591 -0.0044 -0.0591 -0.0051 -0.0733 -0.0052 -0.0734 
 [0.054] [0.018] [0.052] [0.018] [0.054] [0.016] [0.051] [0.016] 
OPEFF -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 
 [0.000] [0.24] [0.000] [0.25] [0.000] [0.34] [0.000] [0.33] 
CA 0.0062 -0.2004 0.0063 -0.2002 0.0092 -0.2173 0.0094 -0.2173 
 [0.047] [0] [0.045] [0] [0.018] [0] [0.016] [0] 
CDTA -0.0048 -0.0237 -0.0048 -0.0235 -0.0058 -0.03 -0.0058 -0.0292 
 [0.063] [0.35] [0.065] [0.36] [0.079] [0.36] [0.080] [0.37] 
TIATA -0.0048 0.002 -0.0048 0.002 -0.0071 -0.0194 -0.0072 -0.0193 
 [0.002] [0.89] [0.002] [0.90] [0.000] [0.31] [0.000] [0.32] 
PE 0.0017 0.0088 0.0017 0.0089 0.0022 0.0077 0.0022 0.0078 
 [0.000] [0.008] [0.000] [0.008] [0.000] [0.039] [0.000] [0.037] 
Obs 17118 17118 17118 17118 17118 17118 17118 17118 
# banks 627 627 627 627 627 627 627 627 
Robust p values in brackets 
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Table 7: Baseline specification with one-step Arellano-Bond dynamic GMM 
Depvar ROA ROE ROA ROE 
LD.depvar 0.0693 0.0642 0.0692 0.0644 
 [0.000] [0.008] [0.000] [0.0080] 
D.conc1 0.0749 0.6375   
 [0.000] [0.000]   
D.conc2   0.0839 0.7002 
   [0.000] [0.000] 
D.MS 0.0694 1.0114 0.0694 1.0117 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
D.lnTA 0.2297 3.5096 0.2245 3.489 
 [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
D.lnTA2 -0.0281 -0.3357 -0.0281 -0.3357 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
D.OPEFF 0 0 0 0 
 [0.85] [0.74] [0.88] [0.76] 
D.CA 0.0251 -0.0334 0.0252 -0.0328 
 [0.000] [0.24] [0.000] [0.25] 
D.CDTA -0.0064 0.0005 -0.0063 0.0008 
 [0.13] [0.99] [0.14] [0.98] 
D.TIATA -0.0052 0.0108 -0.0051 0.0112 
 [0.14] [0.76] [0.14] [0.75] 
D.PE 0 -0.0003 0 -0.0002 
 [0.83] [0.62] [0.87] [0.64] 
Obs 18763 18756 18763 18756 
# banks 640 640 640 640 
Robust p values in brackets  
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Table 8: Baseline specification with two-step Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond dynamic GMM 
Depvar ROA ROE ROA ROE 
L.depvar 0.1407 0.1375 0.1409 0.1377 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
conc1 0.0484 0.5076   
 [0.013] [0.005]   
conc2   0.0511 0.5144 
   [0.016] [0.007] 
MS 0.0679 1.0281 0.068 1.0303 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
lnTA 0.3729 4.4489 0.3759 4.4949 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
lnTA2 -0.0229 -0.27 -0.023 -0.2731 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
OPEFF 0 0.0002 0 0.0002 
 [0.071] [0.036] [0.072] [0.037] 
CA 0.0189 -0.0377 0.0189 -0.0363 
 [0.001] [0.20] [0.001] [0.21] 
CDTA -0.0121 -0.0275 -0.0119 -0.0247 
 [0.005] [0.49] [0.005] [0.53] 
TIATA -0.0091 -0.0171 -0.0091 -0.0163 
 [0.011] [0.60] [0.012] [0.61] 
PE -0.0001 -0.0015 -0.0001 -0.0014 
 [0.080] [0.050] [0.084] [0.054] 
Constant -0.5835 -13.2241 -0.5986 -13.4113 
 [0.094] [0.000] [0.089] [0.000] 
Obs 19518 19510 19518 19510 
# banks 644 644 644 644 
Robust p values in brackets  
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Table 9: Economic significance of baseline results 
Estimation 
method 
Depvar Conc 
index 
Estimated 
coefficient on 
concentration 
Effect of 5% 
increase in 
concentration 
on profitability 
Increase in 
profitability as 
% mean 
profitability 
Effect of 10% 
increase in 
concentration 
on profitability 
Increase in 
profitability as 
% mean 
profitability 
OLS ROA  conc1 0.0253 0.00127 0.310 0.00253 0.619 
ROA  conc2 0.0263 0.00132 0.322 0.00263 0.644 
ROE conc1 0.3678 0.01839 0.406 0.03678 0.812 
ROE conc2 0.3825 0.01913 0.422 0.03825 0.844 
           
2-step 
Arellano-
Bover/Blundell
-Bond  
ROA  conc1 0.0484 0.00242 0.592 0.00484 1.184 
ROA  conc2 0.0511 0.00256 0.625 0.00511 1.250 
ROE conc1 0.5076 0.02538 0.560 0.05076 1.120 
ROE conc2 0.5144 0.02572 0.568 0.05144 1.135 
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Table 10: Baseline specification excluding banks included in the concentration indices, with OLS 
 Depvar ROA ROE ROA ROE 
conc1 0.0245 0.3764   
 [0.000] [0.000]   
conc2   0.0182 0.3142 
   [0.016] [0.000] 
MS 0.8138 8.0721 3.3911 34.0396 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
lnTA 0.1877 1.8087 0.3386 2.7027 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
lnTA2 -0.018 -0.151 -0.0306 -0.2282 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
OPEFF 0 0.0002 0 0.0002 
 [0.593] [0.003] [0.793] [0.001] 
CA 0.0151 -0.1621 0.015 -0.1597 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
CDTA -0.0007 0.0635 -0.0008 0.0701 
 [0.769] [0.001] [0.751] [0.001] 
TIATA -0.0009 0.063 -0.0013 0.0612 
 [0.573] [0.000] [0.433] [0.000] 
PE 0 -0.0019 0 -0.0019 
 [0.665] [0.000] [0.692] [0.000] 
Constant -0.2045 -6.3201 -0.6556 -9.1508 
 [0.345] [0.003] [0.008] [0.000] 
Obs 19516 19516 18543 18543 
# banks 635 635 615 615 
R-sq 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.13 
Robust p values in brackets  
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Table 11: Baseline specification excluding banks included in the concentration indices, with 2-
step efficient GMM 
 Depvar ROA ROE ROA ROE 
conc1 0.036 0.2636   
 [0.000] [0.001]   
conc2   0.0397 0.2274 
   [0.000] [0.004] 
MS 0.0113 0.095 0.5897 5.0591 
 [0.87] [0.85] [0.013] [0.003] 
lnTA 0.022 0.6721 0.0801 1.1517 
 [0.61] [0.16] [0.12] [0.037] 
lnTA2 -0.0022 -0.0543 -0.0068 -0.0888 
 [0.43] [0.071] [0.050] [0.015] 
OPEFF -0.0004 -0.0016 -0.0003 -0.0013 
 [0.000] [0.0021] [0.000] [0.001] 
CA 0.0034 -0.2689 0.0035 -0.2675 
 [0.37] [0.000] [0.33] [0.000] 
CDTA -0.0034 -0.0211 -0.0033 0.0131 
 [0.33] [0.57] [0.38] [0.73] 
TIATA -0.0064 -0.0176 -0.0054 0.0067 
 [0.0015] [0.43] [0.010] [0.77] 
PE 0.0031 0.0153 0.0027 0.0101 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] 
Obs 16595 16595 15730 15730 
# banks 617 617 597 597 
Robust p values in brackets  
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Table 12: Baseline specification excluding banks included in the concentration indices, with one-
step Arellano-Bond dynamic GMM 
 Depvar ROA ROE ROA ROE 
LD.ROA 0.0537 0.0503 0.0323 0.0202 
 [0.0042] [0.046] [0.16] [0.45] 
D.conc1 0.0848 0.7095   
 [0.000] [0.000]   
D.conc2   0.0967 0.8173 
   [0.000] [0.000] 
D.MS 0.4747 5.2581 1.96 20.6324 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
D.lnTA 0.195 1.6675 0.5902 4.7055 
 [0.079] [0.12] [0.000] [0.001] 
D.lnTA2 -0.0275 -0.219 -0.059 -0.4669 
 [0.000] [0.008] [0.000] [0.000] 
D.OPEFF 0 0 0 0 
 [0.80] [0.78] [0.77] [0.73] 
D.CA 0.0245 -0.0577 0.026 -0.0494 
 [0.000] [0.056] [0.000] [0.17] 
D.CDTA -0.007 -0.0067 -0.0045 0.0111 
 [0.098] [0.87] [0.27] [0.82] 
D.TIATA -0.0051 0.0139 -0.0051 0.0098 
 [0.18] [0.71] [0.17] [0.82] 
D.PE 0 -0.0002 0 -0.0001 
 [0.80] [0.68] [0.95] [0.78] 
Obs 18205 18198 17282 17275 
# banks 631 631 610 610 
Robust p values in brackets  
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Table 13: Baseline specification excluding banks included in the concentration indices, with two-
step Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond dynamic GMM 
 Depvar ROA ROE ROA ROE 
L.ROA 0.1235 0.1192 0.1095 0.1125 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
conc1 0.0501 0.4513   
 [0.018] [0.013]   
conc2   0.0585 0.4766 
   [0.011] [0.010] 
MS 0.3883 4.5576 2.3461 25.0322 
 [0.009] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] 
lnTA 0.3646 3.216 0.8376 6.9331 
 [0.002] [0.060] [0.000] [0.002] 
lnTA2 -0.0228 -0.1855 -0.0608 -0.4906 
 [0.008] [0.13] [0.000] [0.004] 
OPEFF 0 0.0002 0 0.0002 
 [0.12] [0.061] [0.14] [0.063] 
CA 0.0201 -0.0418 0.024 -0.035 
 [0.001] [0.25] [0.000] [0.51] 
CDTA -0.0135 -0.0401 -0.0092 -0.0124 
 [0.011] [0.25] [0.029] [0.73] 
TIATA -0.0095 -0.0127 -0.0084 -0.0194 
 [0.026] [0.68] [0.014] [0.50] 
PE -0.0001 -0.0013 -0.0001 -0.0013 
 [0.14] [0.081] [0.26] [0.10] 
Constant -0.5145 -9.1089 -2.1187 -19.7064 
 [0.37] [0.11] [0.000] [0.005] 
Obs 18942 18934 17992 17984 
# banks 635 635 614 614 
Robust p values in brackets  
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Table 14: Disaggregation by size into quintiles with baseline OLS regression (with conc1) 
 Depvar ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE 
quintile quintile1 quintile2 quintile3 quintile4 quintile5 quintile1 quintile2 quintile3 quintile4 quintile5 
conc1 0.0328 0.014 0.0126 0.0456 0.0699 0.3568 0.1915 -0.0832 0.624 0.916 
 [0.052] [0.146] [0.202] [0.046] [0.000] [0.000] [0.085] [0.490] [0.004] [0.000] 
MS 102.5646 112.4099 58.8018 16.5578 0.0995 832.7901 1,367.12 693.08 157.9667 1.383 
 [0.021] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.007] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
lnTA 3.904 0.0662 -0.1477 1.9685 0.246 8.3006 -0.2967 -1.3334 31.9361 3.8569 
 [0.000] [0.944] [0.846] [0.000] [0.018] [0.014] [0.978] [0.888] [0.000] [0.003] 
lnTA2 -0.3742 -0.0279 -0.0112 -0.1446 -0.019 -0.7269 -0.2325 -0.1576 -2.2617 -0.2869 
 [0.000] [0.725] [0.846] [0.000] [0.000] [0.028] [0.802] [0.825] [0.000] [0.000] 
OPEFF 0 0 0 0 0 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0006 
 [0.418] [0.001] [0.277] [0.494] [0.810] [0.146] [0.003] [0.417] [0.612] [0.026] 
CA 0.0184 0.0082 0.007 0.0095 0.02 -0.0065 -0.1985 -0.2251 -0.1657 -0.3239 
 [0.026] [0.002] [0.086] [0.004] [0.000] [0.776] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
CDTA 0.0071 -0.0029 0.006 0.0043 0.0018 0.0028 -0.0423 0.0686 -0.0315 0.0418 
 [0.031] [0.239] [0.092] [0.226] [0.735] [0.887] [0.200] [0.095] [0.396] [0.353] 
TIATA 0.0067 -0.0018 0.0028 0.0035 0.0027 0.0093 -0.0276 0.0452 0.0014 0.0488 
 [0.007] [0.264] [0.123] [0.020] [0.162] [0.550] [0.264] [0.118] [0.928] [0.036] 
PE -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001 0 -0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0023 -0.0007 0.0002 -0.0046 
 [0.539] [0.000] [0.183] [0.392] [0.269] [0.092] [0.007] [0.312] [0.722] [0.013] 
Constant -10.9576 0.2726 0.6666 -7.2874 -0.7954 -23.7747 9.1039 8.0309 -112.293 -9.8233 
 [0.000] [0.923] [0.792] [0.000] [0.078] [0.009] [0.779] [0.796] [0.000] [0.092] 
Obs 3573 4038 4085 4175 4241 3573 4038 4085 4175 4241 
# banks 230 292 285 226 148 230 292 285 226 148 
R-sq 0.21 0.51 0.49 0.42 0.11 0.26 0.46 0.43 0.35 0.15 
Robust p values in brackets       
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Table 15: Disaggregation by size into quintiles with baseline OLS regression (with conc2) 
 Depvar ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE 
 Quintile quintile1 quintile2 quintile3 quintile4 quintile5 quintile1 quintile2 quintile3 quintile4 quintile5 
conc2 0.0358 0.0139 0.014 0.0491 0.0731 0.375 0.1997 -0.098 0.6729 0.9719 
 [0.060] [0.186] [0.173] [0.038] [0.000] [0.000] [0.102] [0.441] [0.003] [0.000] 
MS 102.59 112.4273 58.7999 16.556 0.0995 833.065 1,367.28 693.102 157.9447 1.3839 
 [0.021] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.007] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
lnTA 3.8978 0.0654 -0.1542 1.9714 0.2457 8.2722 -0.2746 -1.2805 31.9799 3.8469 
 [0.000] [0.945] [0.839] [0.000] [0.018] [0.015] [0.980] [0.892] [0.000] [0.003] 
lnTA2 -0.3735 -0.0278 -0.0106 -0.1448 -0.019 -0.7245 -0.2345 -0.162 -2.2647 -0.2865 
 [0.000] [0.726] [0.853] [0.000] [0.000] [0.028] [0.800] [0.820] [0.000] [0.000] 
OPEFF 0 0 0 0 0 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0006 
 [0.418] [0.001] [0.279] [0.490] [0.804] [0.146] [0.003] [0.416] [0.609] [0.026] 
CA 0.0184 0.0082 0.007 0.0095 0.0199 -0.007 -0.1987 -0.2256 -0.1659 -0.3244 
 [0.026] [0.002] [0.084] [0.004] [0.000] [0.761] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
CDTA 0.0072 -0.0029 0.0061 0.0044 0.0019 0.0034 -0.0421 0.0684 -0.0312 0.0423 
 [0.030] [0.241] [0.089] [0.226] [0.725] [0.862] [0.202] [0.095] [0.403] [0.348] 
TIATA 0.0067 -0.0018 0.0028 0.0034 0.0028 0.0093 -0.0277 0.045 0.0012 0.0493 
 [0.007] [0.258] [0.121] [0.021] [0.156] [0.553] [0.260] [0.120] [0.937] [0.035] 
PE -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001 0 -0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0023 -0.0007 0.0003 -0.0046 
 [0.539] [0.000] [0.184] [0.389] [0.268] [0.091] [0.007] [0.311] [0.719] [0.013] 
Constant -10.9468 0.2774 0.684 -7.3004 -0.8015 -23.7074 9.0515 7.9026 -112.488 -9.8754 
  [0.000] [0.922] [0.786] [0.000] [0.076] [0.009] [0.781] [0.799] [0.000] [0.090] 
Obs. 3573 4038 4085 4175 4241 3573 4038 4085 4175 4241 
No. banks 230 292 285 226 148 230 292 285 226 148 
R-sq 0.21 0.51 0.49 0.42 0.11 0.26 0.46 0.43 0.35 0.15 
Robust p values in brackets        
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Table 16: Disaggregation by size into quartiles with baseline OLS regression (with conc1) 
 Depvar ROA ROA ROA ROA ROE ROE ROE ROE 
 Quartile quartile1 quartile2 quartile3 quartile4 quartile1 quartile2 quartile3 quartile4 
conc1 0.0295 0.0052 0.0377 0.055 0.2929 0.0784 0.3349 0.7835 
 [0.025] [0.580] [0.080] [0.000] [0.000] [0.519] [0.099] [0.000] 
MS 112.9414 82.3941 24.2258 0.0998 984.9516 985.8871 241.6762 1.3818 
 [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
lnTA 3.0315 -0.8109 -0.605 0.1352 6.3875 -11.6252 -8.6081 2.7231 
 [0.000] [0.216] [0.151] [0.095] [0.023] [0.180] [0.084] [0.008] 
lnTA2 -0.2878 0.0456 0.028 -0.0134 -0.576 0.7316 0.4961 -0.2312 
 [0.000] [0.387] [0.369] [0.002] [0.031] [0.290] [0.170] [0.000] 
OPEFF 0 0 0 0 0.0001 0.0002 0 0.0004 
 [0.348] [0.055] [0.109] [0.878] [0.044] [0.065] [0.545] [0.052] 
CA 0.0146 0.0065 0.0074 0.017 -0.035 -0.2059 -0.2084 -0.2985 
 [0.039] [0.036] [0.017] [0.000] [0.109] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
CDTA 0.0043 -0.0032 0.0024 0.0054 -0.0087 -0.057 0.0071 0.0638 
 [0.134] [0.300] [0.318] [0.283] [0.651] [0.171] [0.797] [0.127] 
TIATA 0.0044 -0.0021 0.0033 0.0045 0.0005 -0.0301 0.0576 0.0559 
 [0.034] [0.198] [0.083] [0.013] [0.973] [0.291] [0.008] [0.006] 
PE -0.0001 -0.0002 0 -0.0001 -0.001 -0.0023 -0.0004 -0.0035 
 [0.461] [0.014] [0.226] [0.526] [0.027] [0.016] [0.395] [0.030] 
Constant -8.5413 3.0212 2.259 -0.4314 -17.1939 43.9243 31.0964 -5.4962 
  [0.000] [0.138] [0.114] [0.213] [0.024] [0.110] [0.073] [0.219] 
Obs. 4543 5144 5134 5291 4543 5144 5134 5291 
# banks 274 323 289 185 274 323 289 185 
R-sq 0.24 0.5 0.39 0.1 0.31 0.43 0.32 0.14 
Robust p values in brackets        
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Table 17: Disaggregation by size into quartiles with baseline OLS regression (with conc2) 
 Depvar ROA ROA ROA ROA ROE ROE ROE ROE 
 Quartile quartile1 quartile2 quartile3 quartile4 quartile1 quartile2 quartile3 quartile4 
conc2 0.0317 0.0046 0.041 0.0564 0.3007 0.0764 0.3515 0.8236 
 [0.032] [0.644] [0.071] [0.000] [0.000] [0.560] [0.101] [0.000] 
MS 112.9643 82.3949 24.2144 0.0998 985.2502 985.8984 241.5821 1.3826 
 [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
lnTA 3.0294 -0.8116 -0.6059 0.1347 6.4032 -11.6224 -8.648 2.7136 
 [0.000] [0.216] [0.149] [0.096] [0.023] [0.180] [0.082] [0.008] 
lnTA2 -0.2876 0.0456 0.0281 -0.0134 -0.5783 0.7312 0.4989 -0.2307 
 [0.000] [0.387] [0.366] [0.002] [0.030] [0.290] [0.167] [0.000] 
OPEFF 0 0 0 0 0.0001 0.0002 0 0.0004 
 [0.348] [0.056] [0.112] [0.885] [0.045] [0.065] [0.552] [0.051] 
CA 0.0145 0.0065 0.0074 0.017 -0.0354 -0.2062 -0.2084 -0.2992 
 [0.039] [0.037] [0.017] [0.000] [0.106] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
CDTA 0.0043 -0.0032 0.0025 0.0055 -0.0083 -0.0569 0.0081 0.0646 
 [0.129] [0.301] [0.307] [0.276] [0.666] [0.172] [0.769] [0.123] 
TIATA 0.0044 -0.0021 0.0033 0.0045 0.0003 -0.0302 0.0576 0.0564 
 [0.034] [0.195] [0.084] [0.013] [0.983] [0.289] [0.008] [0.006] 
PE -0.0001 -0.0002 0 -0.0001 -0.001 -0.0023 -0.0004 -0.0035 
 [0.459] [0.014] [0.234] [0.523] [0.027] [0.016] [0.404] [0.030] 
Constant -8.538 3.0262 2.2591 -0.4341 -17.2061 43.9352 31.2208 -5.534 
  [0.000] [0.137] [0.113] [0.210] [0.024] [0.110] [0.071] [0.216] 
Obs. 4543 5144 5134 5291 4543 5144 5134 5291 
# banks 274 323 289 185 274 323 289 185 
R-sq 0.24 0.5 0.39 0.1 0.31 0.43 0.31 0.14 
Robust p values in brackets        
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Table 18: Disaggregation by size into thirds with baseline OLS regression (with conc1) 
 Depvar ROA ROA ROA ROE ROE ROE 
 Third third1 third2 third3 third1 third2 third3 
conc1 0.025 0.0166 0.0441 0.2196 0.0289 0.6947 
  [0.039] [0.031] [0.000] [0.001] [0.740] [0.000] 
MS 107.8311 43.1536 0.1002 1,095.57 490.3864 1.3765 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
lnTA 2.2514 -0.6837 0.0489 7.1067 -6.9512 1.2968 
 [0.000] [0.030] [0.489] [0.002] [0.064] [0.133] 
lnTA2 -0.2115 0.0327 -0.0089 -0.6946 0.3222 -0.1614 
  [0.000] [0.165] [0.015] [0.001] [0.251] [0.000] 
OPEFF 0 0 0 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 
  [0.294] [0.079] [0.287] [0.035] [0.220] [0.270] 
CA 0.0113 0.01 0.0154 -0.0581 -0.2059 -0.2612 
  [0.044] [0.000] [0.000] [0.007] [0.000] [0.000] 
CDTA 0.0014 0.0029 0.0052 -0.0438 0.0418 0.0543 
  [0.595] [0.244] [0.253] [0.038] [0.156] [0.157] 
TIATA 0.0006 0.0024 0.0058 -0.0405 0.0431 0.056 
  [0.761] [0.043] [0.001] [0.013] [0.014] [0.000] 
PE -0.0001 -0.0001 0 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0018 
  [0.412] [0.007] [0.958] [0.031] [0.030] [0.164] 
Constant -6.1951 2.4752 -0.1612 -14.3829 26.3747 0.7929 
  [0.000] [0.018] [0.640] [0.025] [0.030] [0.839] 
Obs. 6246 6829 7037 6246 6829 7037 
# banks 338 369 244 338 369 244 
R-sq 0.27 0.38 0.08 0.34 0.31 0.11 
Robust p values in brackets       
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Table 19: Disaggregation by size into thirds with baseline OLS regression (with conc2) 
 Depvar ROA ROA ROA ROE ROE ROE 
 Third third1 third2 third3 third1 third2 third3 
conc2 0.0271 0.0171 0.0458 0.2288 0.0119 0.7344 
  [0.048] [0.035] [0.000] [0.002] [0.896] [0.000] 
MS 107.84 43.1522 0.1003 1,095.69 490.4287 1.3772 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
lnTA 2.2513 -0.6862 0.0483 7.1113 -6.9378 1.2843 
 [0.000] [0.029] [0.495] [0.002] [0.064] [0.137] 
lnTA2 -0.2115 0.0329 -0.0089 -0.6954 0.3206 -0.1608 
  [0.000] [0.163] [0.016] [0.001] [0.253] [0.000] 
OPEFF 0 0 0 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 
  [0.294] [0.080] [0.288] [0.035] [0.221] [0.270] 
CA 0.0113 0.01 0.0154 -0.0584 -0.2063 -0.2617 
  [0.045] [0.000] [0.000] [0.007] [0.000] [0.000] 
CDTA 0.0014 0.0029 0.0053 -0.0434 0.0419 0.0551 
  [0.584] [0.236] [0.247] [0.039] [0.153] [0.152] 
TIATA 0.0006 0.0024 0.0058 -0.0406 0.0428 0.0562 
  [0.761] [0.043] [0.001] [0.013] [0.015] [0.000] 
PE -0.0001 -0.0001 0 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0018 
  [0.411] [0.007] [0.958] [0.031] [0.030] [0.165] 
Constant -6.1971 2.4844 -0.1607 -14.3845 26.4004 0.8026 
  [0.000] [0.017] [0.641] [0.026] [0.030] [0.837] 
Obs. 6246 6829 7037 6246 6829 7037 
# banks 338 369 244 338 369 244 
R-sq 0.27 0.38 0.08 0.34 0.31 0.11 
Robust p values in brackets       
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Table 20: Interest intermediate variables regressions in OLS 
 Depvar total gross 
interest 
income 
/TA 
total gross 
interest 
income 
/equity 
total gross 
interest 
income 
/TA 
total gross 
interest 
income 
/equity 
interest 
expense 
/TA 
interest 
expense 
/equity 
interest 
expense 
/TA 
interest 
expense 
/equity 
conc1 0.0004 0.0005   0.0002 -0.0016   
 [0.084] [0.054]   [0.406] [0.086]   
conc2   0.0004 0.0004   0.0002 -0.002 
   [0.011] [0.049]   [0.429] [0.073] 
MS 0.0009 0.0109 0.001 0.0109 0.0005 0.0061 0.0005 0.0061 
 [0.004] [0.010] [0.004] [0.010] [0.006] [0.015] [0.006] [0.015] 
lnTA 0.004 0.0608 0.004 0.0607 0.002 0.0337 0.002 0.0336 
 [0.002] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.057] [0.000] [0.058] [0.000] 
lnTA2 -0.0004 -0.0047 -0.0004 -0.0047 -0.0002 -0.0028 -0.0002 -0.0028 
 [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.011] [0.000] [0.011] [0.000] 
OPEFF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.982] [0.401] [0.982] [0.401] [0.890] [0.216] [0.890] [0.216] 
CA 0.0002 -0.0071 0.0002 -0.0071 0.0002 -0.0063 0.0002 -0.0063 
 [0.353] [0.000] [0.353] [0.000] [0.342] [0.000] [0.343] [0.000] 
CDTA -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0004 
 [0.095] [0.293] [0.096] [0.285] [0.132] [0.069] [0.133] [0.067] 
TIATA -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0004 
 [0.173] [0.209] [0.172] [0.210] [0.224] [0.040] [0.223] [0.040] 
PE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.770] [0.069] [0.770] [0.069] [0.683] [0.043] [0.684] [0.043] 
Constant 0.0064 -0.0407 0.0063 -0.0402 0.0093 0.0147 0.0092 0.0156 
  [0.109] [0.274] [0.112] [0.281] [0.005] [0.671] [0.005] [0.653] 
Obs 20094 20094 20094 20094 20108 20108 20108 20108 
# banks 644 644 644 644 644 644 644 644 
R-sq 0.17 0.43 0.17 0.43 0.19 0.48 0.19 0.48 
Robust p values in brackets     
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Table 21: Interest intermediate variables regressions in two-step efficient GMM 
 Depvar total gross 
interest 
income 
/TA 
total gross 
interest 
income 
/equity 
total gross 
interest 
income 
/TA 
total gross 
interest 
income 
/equity 
interest 
expense 
/TA 
interest 
expense 
/equity 
interest 
expense 
/TA 
interest 
expense 
/equity 
conc1 0.0002 0.0008   -0.0001 -0.0029   
 [0.019] [0.060]   [0.57] [0.034]   
conc2   0.0002 0.0011   -0.0001 -0.0035 
   [0.026] [0.054]   [0.45] [0.020] 
MS 0 0.0007 0 0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0004 
 [0.90] [0.76] [0.91] [0.78] [0.45] [0.85] [0.46] [0.83] 
lnTA 0.0051 0.0478 0.0052 0.0479 0.0019 0.0008 0.0019 0.001 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.045] [0.92] [0.043] [0.91] 
lnTA2 -0.0004 -0.0034 -0.0004 -0.0034 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0003 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.010] [0.60] [0.009] [0.58] 
OPEFF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.70] [0.000] [0.69] [0.000] [0.65] [0.000] [0.61] [0.000] 
CA -0.0001 -0.0114 -0.0001 -0.0114 -0.0001 -0.0106 -0.0002 -0.0106 
 [0.16] [0] [0.16] [0] [0.057] [0] [0.054] [0] 
CDTA 0 0.0006 0 0.0007 0 0.0005 0 0.0005 
 [0.80] [0.20] [0.80] [0.19] [0.72] [0.28] [0.75] [0.28] 
TIATA 0 0.0001 0 0.0001 0 -0.0003 0 -0.0003 
 [0.77] [0.69] [0.76] [0.67] [0.86] [0.29] [0.89] [0.30] 
PE 0 0.0004 0 0.0004 0 0.0004 0 0.0004 
 [0.71] [0.000] [0.68] [0.000] [0.51] [0.000] [0.48] [0.000] 
Obs 17108 17108 17108 17108 17153 17153 17153 17153 
# banks 627 627 627 627 627 627 627 627 
R-sq 0.122 0.3 0.122 0.296 0.138 0.324 0.138 0.328 
Robust p values in brackets     
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Table 22: Interest intermediate variables regressions with one-step Arellano-Bond dynamic 
GMM 
 Depvar total gross 
interest 
income 
/TA 
total gross 
interest 
income 
/equity 
total gross 
interest 
income 
/TA 
total gross 
interest 
income 
/equity 
interest 
expense 
/TA 
interest 
expense 
/equity 
interest 
expense 
/TA 
interest 
expense 
/equity 
LD.depv
ar 0.374 0.3738 0.3738 0.3753 0.3805 0.4209 0.3806 0.4229 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
D.conc1 0.0036 0.0189   -0.0032 -0.0144   
 [0.022] [0.000]   [0.030] [0.000]   
D.conc2   0.0041 0.0202   -0.0036 -0.0152 
   [0.028] [0.000]   [0.037] [0.000] 
D.MS 0.0005 0.0049 0.0005 0.0049 0.0003 0.0024 0.0003 0.0024 
 [0.004] [0.071] [0.004] [0.071] [0.021] [0.22] [0.019] [0.22] 
D.lnTA -0.0025 -0.025 -0.0028 -0.0247 -0.0044 -0.0524 -0.0046 -0.0518 
 [0.56] [0.23] [0.54] [0.24] [0.21] [0.000] [0.22] [0.000] 
D.lnTA2 -0.0006 -0.0038 -0.0006 -0.0038 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0006 
 [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.002] [0.008] [0.42] [0.009] [0.42] 
D.OPEF
F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.069] [0.66] [0.074] [0.70] [0.13] [0.62] [0.13] [0.67] 
D.CA 0.0006 -0.0066 0.0006 -0.0066 0.0006 -0.0055 0.0006 -0.0055 
 [0.037] [0] [0.035] [0] [0.049] [0] [0.048] [0] 
D.CDTA -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0007 
 [0.024] [0.060] [0.024] [0.066] [0.035] [0.024] [0.035] [0.026] 
D.TIAT
A -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0005 -0.0004 0.0005 
 [0.063] [0.49] [0.061] [0.47] [0.10] [0.016] [0.098] [0.016] 
D.PE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.024] [0.074] [0.025] [0.093] [0.061] [0.047] [0.063] [0.065] 
Obs 18766 18759 18766 18759 18797 18790 18797 18790 
# banks 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 
Robust p values in brackets     
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Table 23: Interest intermediate variables regressions with two-step Arellano-Bover/Blundell-
Bond dynamic GMM 
 Depvar total gross 
interest 
income 
/TA 
total gross 
interest 
income 
/equity 
total gross 
interest 
income 
/TA 
total gross 
interest 
income 
/equity 
interest 
expense 
/TA 
interest 
expense 
/equity 
interest 
expense 
/TA 
interest 
expense 
/equity 
l.depvar 0.4195 0.2661 0.4198 0.2664 0.4154 0.2475 0.4155 0.2467 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
conc1 0.0026 0.001   -0.0022 -0.0043   
 [0.019] [0.067]   [0.20] [0.029]   
conc2   0.003 0.0001   -0.0026 -0.006 
   [0.020] [0.096]   [0.22] [0.006] 
MS 0.0003 0.0043 0.0003 0.0043 0.0001 0.0018 0.0001 0.0018 
 [0.18] [0.096] [0.17] [0.096] [0.43] [0.33] [0.41] [0.33] 
lnTA 0.0123 0.1103 0.0122 0.1103 0.0089 0.0515 0.0089 0.0514 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.00051] [0.000] [0.015] [0.000] [0.015] [0.000] 
lnTA2 -0.0007 -0.0066 -0.0007 -0.0066 -0.0005 -0.0031 -0.0005 -0.0031 
 [0.002] [0] [0.002] [0] [0.029] [0.000] [0.028] [0.000] 
OPEFF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.27] [0.47] [0.28] [0.47] [0.27] [0.31] [0.27] [0.34] 
CA 0.0005 -0.0059 0.0005 -0.006 0.0005 -0.0056 0.0005 -0.0057 
 [0.12] [0] [0.13] [0] [0.12] [0] [0.12] [0] 
CDTA -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0003 
 [0.079] [0.19] [0.081] [0.22] [0.084] [0.45] [0.090] [0.50] 
TIATA -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0003 
 [0.10] [0.13] [0.11] [0.13] [0.11] [0.39] [0.12] [0.40] 
PE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.28] [0.69] [0.28] [0.68] [0.27] [0.36] [0.28] [0.38] 
Constant -0.0061 -0.2705 -0.0071 -0.2673 0.0036 -0.0711 0.0028 -0.0658 
 [0.71] [0.000] [0.65] [0.000] [0.79] [0.095] [0.83] [0.13] 
Obs 19521 19513 19521 19513 19542 19534 19542 19534 
# banks 644 644 644 644 644 644 644 644 
Robust p values in brackets     
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Table 24: Non-interest intermediate variables regressions in OLS 
 Depvar 
other 
income 
/TA 
other 
income 
/equity 
other 
income 
/TA 
other 
income 
/equity 
other 
expense 
/TA 
other 
expense 
/equity 
other 
expense 
/TA 
other 
expense 
/equity 
conc1 0.0002 0.0023   -0.0006 -0.0042   
 [0.061] [0.020]   [0.002] [0.000]   
conc2   0.0002 0.0026   -0.0006 -0.0046 
   [0.052] [0.016]   [0.003] [0.000] 
MS 0.0005 0.0057 0.0005 0.0057 -0.0002 -0.0013 -0.0002 -0.0013 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.171] [0.616] [0.170] [0.615] 
lnTA 0.0005 0.0076 0.0005 0.0076 0.0015 0.0076 0.0015 0.0075 
 [0.319] [0.165] [0.316] [0.163] [0.113] [0.381] [0.118] [0.383] 
lnTA2 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 [0.002] [0.479] [0.002] [0.477] [0.329] [0.824] [0.328] [0.823] 
OPEFF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.565] [0.003] [0.565] [0.003] [0.698] [0.082] [0.698] [0.082] 
CA 0.0002 -0.0053 0.0002 -0.0053 -0.0002 0.0086 -0.0002 0.0086 
 [0.083] [0.000] [0.083] [0.000] [0.276] [0.000] [0.276] [0.000] 
CDTA -0.0002 0.0013 -0.0002 0.0013 0.0001 -0.002 0.0001 -0.002 
 [0.000] [0.036] [0.000] [0.036] [0.083] [0.001] [0.084] [0.001] 
TIATA -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0008 0.0002 -0.0008 
 [0.000] [0.341] [0.000] [0.341] [0.001] [0.103] [0.001] [0.102] 
PE 0 -0.0001 0 -0.0001 0 0.0001 0 0.0001 
 [0.501] [0.002] [0.502] [0.002] [0.461] [0.037] [0.462] [0.037] 
Constant 0.026 -0.0042 0.026 -0.0049 -0.0352 -0.1525 -0.0351 -0.1518 
  [0.000] [0.938] [0.000] [0.928] [0.000] [0.012] [0.000] [0.013] 
Obs 20102 20102 20102 20102 20101 20101 20101 20101 
# banks 644 644 644 644 644 644 644 644 
R-sq 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.09 0.22 0.09 0.22 
Robust p values in brackets     
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Table 25: Non-interest intermediate variables regressions in two-step efficient GMM 
 Depvar other 
income 
/TA 
other 
income 
/equity 
other 
income 
/TA 
other 
income 
/equity 
other 
expense 
/TA 
other 
expense 
/equity 
other 
expense 
/TA 
other 
expense 
/equity 
conc1 -0.0001 -0.0018   -0.0003 -0.0001   
 [0.21] [0.51]   [0.016] [0.098]   
conc2   -0.0001 -0.0025   -0.0003 -0.0003 
   [0.35] [0.42]   [0.012] [0.092] 
MS 0 -0.0032 0 -0.0032 0.0002 0.0043 0.0002 0.0043 
 [0.67] [0.36] [0.71] [0.36] [0.36] [0.20] [0.36] [0.20] 
lnTA 0.0008 0.0106 0.0009 0.0108 0 -0.0063 -0.0001 -0.0063 
 [0.072] [0.31] [0.051] [0.30] [0.98] [0.60] [0.90] [0.60] 
lnTA2 -0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0001 -0.0011 0.0002 0.0018 0.0002 0.0018 
 [0.000] [0.082] [0.000] [0.079] [0.009] [0.028] [0.0061] [0.028] 
OPEFF 0 0.0001 0 0.0001 0 -0.0001 0 -0.0001 
 [0.57] [0.0091] [0.54] [0.0058] [0.26] [0.000] [0.22] [0.000] 
CA 0.0001 -0.0032 0.0001 -0.0032 -0.0002 0.0057 -0.0002 0.0057 
 [0.12] [0.0038] [0.055] [0.0041] [0.072] [0.000] [0.038] [0.000] 
CDTA -0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0009 0.0001 0 0.0001 0.0001 
 [0.000] [0.40] [0.000] [0.36] [0.20] [0.98] [0.13] [0.92] 
TIATA -0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0003 -0.0009 0.0002 0.0005 0.0002 0.0005 
 [0] [0.083] [0] [0.072] [0.000] [0.30] [0.000] [0.28] 
PE 0 -0.0003 0 -0.0003 0 0.0004 0 0.0004 
 [0.98] [0.051] [0.78] [0.048] [0.64] [0.007] [0.76] [0.005] 
Obs 17125 17125 17125 17125 17121 17121 17121 17121 
# banks 627 627 627 627 627 627 627 627 
R-sq 0.143 -0.063 0.14 -0.114 0.055 -0.048 0.04 -0.111 
Robust p values in brackets     
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Table 26: Non-interest intermediate variables regressions with one-step Arellano-Bond dynamic 
GMM 
 Depvar other 
income 
/TA 
other 
income 
/equity 
other 
income 
/TA 
other 
income 
/equity 
other 
expense 
/TA 
other 
expense 
/equity 
other 
expense 
/TA 
other 
expense 
/equity 
LD.depvar 0.1758 0.0218 0.1747 0.0215 0.262 0.0383 0.261 0.0383 
 [0.003] [0.57] [0.003] [0.57] [0.000] [0.20] [0.000] [0.21] 
D.conc1 0.0015 0.0028   -0.0021 -0.0057   
 [0.001] [0.51]   [0.039] [0.14]   
D.conc2   0.0018 0.0034   -0.0024 -0.0063 
   [0.001] [0.47]   [0.041] [0.13] 
D.MS 0.0003 0.0032 0.0003 0.0032 0.0001 0.0024 0.0001 0.0024 
 [0.002] [0.005] [0.001] [0.005] [0.51] [0.065] [0.52] [0.065] 
D.lnTA 0.0024 0.0427 0.0022 0.0421 -0.0019 -0.0173 -0.0016 -0.017 
 [0.040] [0.009] [0.078] [0.010] [0.38] [0.21] [0.47] [0.21] 
D.lnTA2 -0.0003 -0.0028 -0.0003 -0.0028 0.0005 0.003 0.0005 0.003 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.005] [0.000] [0.005] 
D.OPEFF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.35] [0.40] [0.38] [0.40] [0.44] [0.42] [0.46] [0.42] 
D.CA 0.0005 -0.0014 0.0005 -0.0014 -0.0006 0.0053 -0.0006 0.0053 
 [0.001] [0.008] [0.001] [0.009] [0.008] [0.000] [0.007] [0.000] 
D.CDTA -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0004 0.0011 0.0004 0.0011 
 [0.006] [0.65] [0.006] [0.65] [0.002] [0.24] [0.002] [0.24] 
D.TIATA -0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0011 0.0004 0.0007 0.0004 0.0007 
 [0.004] [0.10] [0.004] [0.11] [0.013] [0.38] [0.012] [0.39] 
D.PE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.15] [0.34] [0.17] [0.35] [0.22] [0.34] [0.23] [0.34] 
Obs 18759 18752 18759 18752 18756 18749 18756 18749 
# banks 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 
Robust p values in brackets     
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Table 27: Non-interest intermediate variables regressions with two-step Arellano-Bover/ 
Blundell-Bond dynamic GMM 
 Depvar other 
income 
/TA 
other 
income 
/equity 
other 
income 
/TA 
other 
income 
/equity 
other 
expense 
/TA 
other 
expense 
/equity 
other 
expense 
/TA 
other 
expense 
/equity 
l.depvar 0.2341 0.0819 0.2334 0.0817 0.3304 0.085 0.3294 0.0845 
 [0.003] [0.027] [0.002] [0.027] [0.000] [0.005] [0.000] [0.005] 
conc1 0.001 0.001   -0.0022 -0.0065   
 [0.011] [0.069]   [0.055] [0.051]   
conc2   0.0013 0.0024   -0.0026 -0.0083 
   [0.011] [0.035]   [0.061] [0.009] 
MS 0.0002 0.0048 0.0002 0.0048 0.0002 0.001 0.0002 0.001 
 [0.096] [0.014] [0.096] [0.014] [0.20] [0.47] [0.20] [0.48] 
lnTA 0.0046 0.0151 0.0046 0.0152 -0.0071 -0.019 -0.0071 -0.0192 
 [0.044] [0.38] [0.042] [0.37] [0.034] [0.25] [0.037] [0.25] 
lnTA2 -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0008 0.0004 0.0015 0.0004 0.0016 
 [0.065] [0.49] [0.062] [0.48] [0.033] [0.19] [0.035] [0.18] 
OPEFF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.24] [0.28] [0.24] [0.28] [0.35] [0.37] [0.35] [0.38] 
CA 0.0003 -0.0031 0.0003 -0.0031 -0.0004 0.0062 -0.0004 0.0061 
 [0.18] [0.002] [0.17] [0.002] [0.15] [0.000] [0.16] [0.000] 
CDTA -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0009 0.0004 -0.0009 
 [0.003] [0.92] [0.0029] [0.92] [0.034] [0.69] [0.034] [0.69] 
TIATA -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0009 0.0003 -0.0009 
 [0.013] [0.87] [0.014] [0.87] [0.10] [0.63] [0.10] [0.63] 
PE 0 -0.0001 0 -0.0001 0 0 0 0 
 [0.16] [0.26] [0.16] [0.26] [0.31] [0.33] [0.31] [0.33] 
Constant -0.002 0.0116 -0.0025 0.0068 0.0055 0.0223 0.006 0.0279 
 [0.77] [0.89] [0.71] [0.94] [0.45] [0.88] [0.43] [0.85] 
Obs 19510 19502 19510 19502 19508 19500 19508 19500 
# banks 644 644 644 644 644 644 644 644 
Robust p values in brackets     
80 
 
Table 28: Interest rate regressions with OLS 
 Depvar deposit 
interest rate 
deposit 
interest rate 
lending 
interest rate 
lending 
interest rate 
interest rate 
spread 
interest rate 
spread 
conc1 -0.0001  0.001  0.0011  
 [0.117]  [0.000]  [0.000]  
conc2  -0.0001  0.0011  0.0012 
  [0.162]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
MS 0.0005 0.0005 0.0014 0.0014 0.0009 0.0009 
 [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] 
lnTA 0.0036 0.0036 0.0051 0.0051 0.0014 0.0014 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.126] [0.126] [0.520] [0.519] 
lnTA2 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.013] [0.013] [0.087] [0.087] 
OPEFF 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.147] [0.146] [0.202] [0.202] [0.283] [0.283] 
CA 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 
 [0.011] [0.012] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
CDTA -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.002] [0.002] [0.011] [0.011] 
TIATA 0 0 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 [0.085] [0.084] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
PE 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.159] [0.159] [0.183] [0.184] [0.228] [0.228] 
Constant -0.0037 -0.0037 0.03 0.0299 0.0334 0.0334 
  [0.537] [0.536] [0.049] [0.050] [0.001] [0.001] 
Obs 2531 2531 2525 2525 2522 2522 
# banks 58 58 58 58 58 58 
R-sq 0.61 0.61 0.4 0.4 0.22 0.22 
Robust p values in brackets    
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Table 29: Interest rate regressions with two-step efficient GMM 
 Depvar deposit 
interest rate 
deposit 
interest rate 
lending 
interest rate 
lending 
interest rate 
interest rate 
spread 
interest rate 
spread 
conc1 -0.0002  0.0008  0.001  
 [0.093]  [0.001]  [0.000]  
conc2  -0.0002  0.0009  0.0011 
  [0.015]  [0.001]  [0.000] 
MS 0 0 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
 [0.77] [0.70] [0.37] [0.36] [0.14] [0.14] 
lnTA 0.0015 0.0015 -0.0027 -0.0027 -0.0029 -0.003 
 [0.15] [0.16] [0.33] [0.32] [0.16] [0.15] 
lnTA2 -0.0001 -0.0001 0 0 0 0 
 [0.018] [0.022] [0.92] [0.96] [0.88] [0.82] 
OPEFF 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.009] [0.006] 
CA 0 0 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
 [0.72] [0.64] [0.074] [0.077] [0.016] [0.016] 
CDTA -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 [0.023] [0.029] [0.011] [0.012] [0.065] [0.066] 
TIATA 0 0 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
PE 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.0036] [0.002] [0.006] [0.004] 
Obs 2250 2250 2248 2248 2241 2241 
# banks 58 58 58 58 58 58 
R-sq 0.647 0.643 0.403 0.397 0.111 0.101 
Robust p values in brackets    
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Table 30: Interest rate regressions with one-step Arellano-Bond dynamic GMM 
 Depvar deposit 
interest rate 
deposit 
interest rate 
lending 
interest rate 
lending 
interest rate 
interest rate 
spread 
interest rate 
spread 
LD.depvar 0.583 0.5848 0.4053 0.4079 0.304 0.3055 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
D.conc1 -0.0004  0.002  0.0016  
 [0.069]  [0.006]  [0.002]  
D.conc2  -0.0003  0.002  0.0017 
  [0.22]  [0.015]  [0.003] 
D.MS 0.0003 0.0003 0.0006 0.0006 0.0003 0.0003 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.015] [0.015] [0.061] [0.061] 
D.lnTA 0.0016 0.0019 0.0047 0.0052 0.0038 0.0039 
 [0.56] [0.49] [0.53] [0.49] [0.46] [0.46] 
D.lnTA2 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0005 
 [0.11] [0.099] [0.074] [0.070] [0.072] [0.072] 
D.OPEFF 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.70] [0.68] [0.74] [0.70] [0.58] [0.62] 
D.CA -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0004 0 0 
 [0.14] [0.13] [0.24] [0.24] [0.93] [0.93] 
D.CDTA -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 [0.032] [0.027] [0.15] [0.13] [0.29] [0.27] 
D.TIATA 0 0 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 [0.36] [0.33] [0.18] [0.18] [0.15] [0.15] 
D.PE 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.89] [0.87] [0.98] [0.95] [0.44] [0.47] 
Obs 2391 2391 2387 2387 2382 2382 
# banks 58 58 58 58 58 58 
Robust p values in brackets    
 
83 
 
Table 31: Interest rate regressions with two-step Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond dynamic GMM 
 Depvar deposit 
interest rate 
deposit 
interest rate 
lending 
interest rate 
lending 
interest rate 
interest rate 
spread 
interest rate 
spread 
L.depvar 0.4111 0.4111 0.3762 0.3765 0.3588 0.3595 
 [0.000] [0.000 [0.000 [0.000 [0.000 [0.000 
conc1 -0.0006  0.0033  0.0024  
 [0.12]  [0.011]  [0.003]  
conc2  -0.0006  0.0034  0.0025 
  [0.11]  [0.012]  [0.003] 
MS 0.0003 0.0003 0.0006 0.0006 0.0003 0.0004 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.007] [0.007] [0.034] [0.034] 
lnTA 0.0037 0.0037 0.0112 0.011 0.0054 0.0053 
 [0.074] [0.074] [0.044] [0.048] [0.18] [0.19] 
lnTA2 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0004 
 [0.036] [0.035] [0.011] [0.012] [0.051] [0.056] 
OPEFF 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.26] [0.26] [0.29] [0.28] [0.28] [0.27] 
CA 0 0 0.0001 0.0001 0 0 
 [0.58] [0.64] [0.74] [0.68] [0.87] [0.83] 
CDTA -0.0001 -0.0001 0 0 0 0 
 [0.026] [0.030] [0.85] [0.86] [0.95] [0.95] 
TIATA 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.23] [0.23] [0.61] [0.61] [0.53] [0.53] 
PE 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.26] [0.26] [0.22] [0.21] [0.17] [0.17] 
Constant -0.0114 -0.0114 -0.0354 -0.0343 -0.01 -0.0092 
  [0.26] [0.26] [0.24] [0.26] [0.66] [0.68] 
Obs 2462 2462 2457 2457 2453 2453 
# banks 58 58 58 58 58 58 
Robust p values in brackets    
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Appendix 3: Conditional relationship between size and profitability 
 
This appendix discusses, in more detail than in the main text, the relationship between size and 
profitability that emerges from the regression analysis.  
 
Figure A1 depicts the ‘conditional’ relationship between the measure of size (lnTA), on the x-
axis, and the combined effects of the linear and quadratic size parameters (lnTA + lnTA2 on 
profitability. The object of this analysis is to establish at which point the diseconomies of scale 
associated with a negative estimates coefficient on lnTA2 are realized, particularly vis-à-vis the 
actual size distribution of the sample.  
 
The estimated coefficients are from the baseline specification with two-step Arellano-Bover-
Blundell-Bond dynamic GMM. The equation of the upper, darker curve, corresponding to the 
left-hand y-axis, are based on the specification with ROE as the dependent variable, while the 
equation of the lower, lighter-shaded curve, corresponding to the right-hand y-axis, is based on 
the specification with ROA as the dependent variables. The explanatory variables are conc1, 
lnTA, lnTA2, OPEFF, and the control variables CA, CDTA, TIATA, and PE. Each curve is a 
scatterplot of 20 797 points.   
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Figure A1 
Conditional relationship between lnTA and profitability
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The parabolic shape suggests economies of scale in banking but only up to a certain point, 
whereafter diseconomies of scale may kick in. This is likely to be at least in part associated with 
the U-shaped average cost curves in banking typically found in the literature.  
 
The peak of the upper (ROE regression) curve is where lnTA=8.238, while the lower (ROA 
regression) curve peaks at a similar point of lnTA=8.14219. These are of course the same points 
that are found when solving for the first order conditions of )TA(ln
ROE
∂
∂
 and 
)TA(ln
ROA
∂
∂
respectively, and could be interpreted as the ‘optimal’ values of lnTA for profit 
maximisation. 
 
                                                 
19
 Corresponding to TA=$3 785.196m and $3 437.645m respectively (in 2000$). 
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Regarding the distribution of the actual sample used in the regressions, the mean and median 
points of the sample (marked on the chart) are clearly on the upward-sloping part of the parabola. 
81% of the banks in the sample fall below the turning points of the parabolas, suggesting that 
they are enjoying economies of scale. 
 
It should of course be noted that the estimated coefficients used in this analysis are derived from 
a specification focussed on the effects of market structure on concentration, rather than an 
explicit modelling of the size-profitability relationship which would be undertaken for a study 
focussed on that particular issue. Notwithstanding this, the estimates obtained from this exercise 
do make economic sense. These results, although not the main focus of this paper, relate to an 
important debate in the literature concerning the extent of economies of scale in banking.   
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